Volume 75, Issue 4 of the Louisiana Law Review has been uploaded to the Law Review’s Digital Commons page.
Volume 75, Issue 3 of the Louisiana Law Review has been uploaded to the Law Review’s Digital Commons page.
Glenn G. Morris
Paul R. Baier
Glenn G. Morris
Effective January 1, 2015, Louisiana adopted a customized version of the Model Business Corporation Act. The new Act replaces the former Louisiana Business Corporation Law (LBCL) and makes several coordinating changes in other areas of the law. The author served as the Reporter and Chair of the Corporations Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute, the Committee that considered and modified the Model Act for adoption in Louisiana. Louisiana’s modifications to the Model Act were designed to do three things: (1) to adapt the Model Act to Louisiana’s legal system and terminology, (2) to retain some of the desirable features of existing law, and (3) to make what the Committee judged to be corrections or improvements in the Model Act provisions.
This Article summarizes the ways in which the new Act changes the law as well as those in which the law remains largely unchanged. This Article also points out the areas in which the Louisiana version of the Act differs from the Model Act, either by retaining the earlier Louisiana law on the subject, or by offering some new solution to the problem. Louisiana’s
Melissa T. Lonegrass
In their efforts to keep anti-retaliation initiatives in the United Kingdom afloat, tenant advocates point to common law jurisdictions around the world whose landlord–tenant law prohibits retaliatory conduct. New South Wales, Australia, New Zealand, and even the United States provide for these protections—why then should not the United Kingdom? Thus far, comparisons to foreign law have been limited and cursory, pointing only to the presence or absence of anti-retaliation regimes in the law. More comprehensive examination of retaliatory eviction regimes abroad—both in their letter and their application—is lacking. This Article seeks to contribute to the legal–political debate surrounding landlord retaliation in England and Wales by providing a detailed, contextual analysis of retaliatory eviction laws in the United States and their success at home.
Parts II and III of this Article review the ongoing efforts aimed toward prohibiting retaliatory eviction in England and Wales, highlighting the arguments that have led to a stalemate in the progress of law reform in those countries. Part IV then describes in detail the legal regimes that govern landlord retaliation in the United States. As Part IV demonstrates, U.S. anti-retaliation regimes are generally robust, with consensus emerging around strong tenant protections. Part V goes on to examine statistical and anecdotal evidence of tenant evictions that points away from the success of U.S. retaliatory eviction laws. Although this evidence seems to weigh against legal reform in the United Kingdom, Part VI argues that this is not the case. Instead, Part VI provides context for comparisons between the United States and the United Kingdom and concludes that existing legal and non-legal institutions in the United Kingdom will support anti-retaliation regimes in ways not currently possible in this country.
Gail S. Stephenson
This Article reviews the jurisprudence from 1985 to 2015 applying article 2164 and examines the standard applied by Louisiana courts, the circumstances under which frivolous-appeal sanctions will be awarded, the procedural issues attorneys encounter, the types of sanctions awarded, the treatment of pro se litigants, and the ethical issues that arise. It concludes with recommendations for action by the courts and the Louisiana Legislature that could ultimately reduce the number of frivolous appeals.
L. David Cromwell
Whatever its origin, the vendor’s privilege has been a coveted and powerful form of security throughout Louisiana’s history. This Article begins with a short excursus recalling some central notions about the definition and nature of privileges and posits that there actually exist two different vendor’s privileges: the vendor’s privilege on movables and that bearing on immovables. After tracing the origin of both of these vendor’s privileges, this Article explores the policies underlying the privileges, requirements of registry, status of the privileges as real rights, events causing a loss of the privileges, and problems involving ranking. By focusing on the vendor’s privilege as an example, this Article seeks to illustrate, from a broader perspective, the reasons for the existence of privileges, the manner in which they relate to each other and to other forms of security, and the extent to which privileges can remain relevant in a modern civil law system.
J. Michael Veron
In the case of the mythology surrounding oil and gas in Louisiana, false beliefs continue to survive because their underlying premises are accepted as true regardless of whether the facts support them. Indeed, this Article shows that the evidence actually contradicts, rather than supports, their factual underpinnings.
Compensation for Nonpecuniary Loss: Revising Louisiana Civil Code Article 1998 to Reflect Litvinoff ’s Damage-Based Approach
Molly L. Csaki
Part I of this Comment discusses former Louisiana Civil Code article 1934, the legislation that governed the availability of nonpecuniary damages in Louisiana, and the effect it had on Louisiana jurisprudence. Part II analyzes the 1985 revision of article 1934, first discussing the drafters’ attempt to clarify the state of the law surrounding nonpecuniary damages, then highlighting the postrevision ambiguities. Part III evaluates why the restrictive interpretation given to current article 1998 by Louisiana courts has hindered its availability to serve litigants and is inconsistent with the original intent of the Obligations Committee. Finally, Part IV offers a model article that attempts to remedy the conflicting jurisprudence and legislation in Louisiana and to finally give Louisiana courts and practitioners guidance on the availability of nonpecuniary damages for the breach of conventional obligations.
This Comment proposes a multi-step approach to alleviate the current problems presented by Louisiana’s noncompete law. Since the problem of ambiguity as to what constitutes competition is largely of jurisprudential origin, Louisiana courts can solve the problem by focusing on the impact a former employee’s new employment would have on the former employer and enforcing the noncompete only if there is actual or likely competitive impact. With respect to the two-year restraint, legislative intervention is necessary. The Legislature should amend the employment noncompete statute to allow restraint of the former employee for a reasonable time up to two years, which would allow courts to consider the competing interests in each case and cut the enforcement period short where appropriate
This Comment attempts to answer these questions through an exegetical analysis of articles 655 and 656 with a comprehensive survey of the available doctrine and jurisprudence to provide a gloss on the rules for each of the servitude’s elements. Part I begins with a history of the drainage servitude and its predecessors, starting in Rome and moving through developments in French and Louisiana law. Part I concludes with an analysis of the servitude’s proper classification and a comparison to developments in other jurisdictions. Next, Part II presents and considers each formal element of the servitude as it currently exists under the Louisiana Civil Code. Part III considers the duties of each estate owner under the servitude and, in particular, what actions qualify as an “overburdening” of the servitude.
Is a Postmarital Agreement in Your Best Interest? Why Louisiana Civil Code Article 2329 Should Let You Decide
Christopher K. Ulfers
Part I of this Comment offers a historical analysis of marriage, marital contracting in general, and the evolution of marital contracting laws in Louisiana, providing insight into the changing nature of the institution and how such evolution will likely continue. Next, Part II outlines the specific justifications for revising article 2329, offering unique theories as to why the article no longer makes sense in the modern landscape of marriage. Shifting to a study of the differing approaches to the regulation of marital agreements, Part III analyzes how marital contracting is effectively governed in other United States jurisdictions. Lastly, Part IV offers two alternative options that Louisiana could utilize to revise article 2329 and effectively adapt its marital contracting policies to the modern world. As this Comment illustrates, article 2329 is a relic of the past, inefficiently governing the everchanging world of marriage and subjecting its participants to unnecessary burdens. The time is now to revise article 2329 and position the marital institution for a thriving future.
April 13, 2015
By Allison B. Kingsmill, Senior Associate
On March 23, 2015, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Montgomery v. Louisiana to decide whether its ruling in Miller v. Alabama, prohibiting mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles convicted of murder, applies retroactively—that is, to inmates convicted before the decision was issued.
In Montgomery, Henry Montgomery was convicted of murdering a deputy sheriff when he was 17 years old and was automatically sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole as required by Louisiana law. Consequently, Montgomery was sentenced to spend the rest of his life in prison without any consideration of his youth, the circumstances of the crime, or any other mitigating facts. In his petition to the Supreme Court, Montgomery claims that his sentence subjects him to cruel and unusual punishment, which violates the Eighth Amendment and the previous Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama.
In Miller, the Supreme Court reviewed the cases of two 14 year olds who were convicted of murder and sentenced to statutorily mandated punishments of life without parole. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. The Court emphasized that “[m]andatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” Without considering the mitigating facts relevant to youth, the Court concluded that “such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” As a result, the Court did not categorically bar juvenile life sentences without parole but indicated that “occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”
In light of the Miller decision, Montgomery filed a motion to correct his illegal sentence, arguing that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing with the possibility of parole. However, the state district court denied Montgomery’s motion. Moreover, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Montgomery’s writ application, refusing to apply Miller retroactively.
The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether to apply Miller retroactively. As a result, following Miller, the retroactivity issue has divided state and federal courts across the country. The question before the Court in Montgomery is whether Miller applies retroactively to defendants who received statutorily mandated life-without-parole sentences before the Miller decision was handed down. Most state courts, as well as six federal circuit courts, have applied Miller retroactively, interpreting it as a substantive rule banning mandatory life sentences for juveniles. In contrast, only four states—Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania—have ruled against retroactivity, viewing Miller as merely an announcement of a new procedural rule.
In determining the retroactivity of Supreme Court decisions, courts apply the standards established by Teague v. Lane. In Teague, the Court held that a new rule will be applied retroactively if (1) it places “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe” or (2) creates a procedure “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Courts holding in favor of retroactivity have concluded that Miller falls within Teague’s first exception, because it “explicitly forecloses the imposition of a certain category of punishment—mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole—on a specific class of defendants: those individuals under the age of 18 when they commit the crime of murder.”
On the other hand, courts ruling against retroactivity have reasoned that Miller mandated only that a court consider an offender’s youth before imposing a particular penalty and therefore “simply altered the range of permissible methods for determining whether a juvenile could be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.”
Amidst the division among states and the need for uniformity, the United States Supreme Court granted review of Montgomery’s case and thereby decided to end the uncertainty of Miller’s application. The Supreme Court originally agreed in December 2014 to consider the issue of retroactivity in another Louisiana case, Toca v. Louisiana. Similar to Montgomery, George Toca received a mandatory-life-without-parole sentence when he was a juvenile. However, after years of incarceration, Toca accepted a plea deal with prosecutors and was released from prison. Consequently, his petition became moot before the Supreme Court and was automatically dismissed.
Montgomery and Toca’s petitions represent a recurring issue before the Supreme Court and present a critical question for juvenile offenders already sentenced to life without parole: Should they be resentenced? Prisoners sentenced to life as juveniles receive new sentencing hearings across the nation, while convicted juveniles like Montgomery remain condemned to spend the rest of their lives in prison. As a result, whether Miller should be applied retroactively is an important question that must be resolved as soon as possible.
Whether the Court will apply Miller retroactively remains uncertain. However, if the Court finds in favor of retroactivity, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania will be most heavily impacted, as they will have to review all previously mandated life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders.
 Lyle Denniston, Court to Try Again on Juveniles’ Life Sentences, SCOTUSblog (Mar. 23, 2015, 4:47 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/03/court-to-try-again-on-juveniles-life-sentences/, archived at http://perma.cc/NS4C-YDDV.
 State v. Montgomery, 242 So. 2d 818 (La. 1970).
 See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 141 So. 3d 264 (La. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Sept. 5, 2014) (No. 14-280).
 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
 Id. at 2468.
 Id. at 2469.
 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 141 So. 3d 264 (La. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Sept. 5, 2014) (No. 14-280).
 State v. Montgomery, 140 So. 3d 264 (La. 2014).
 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2-3, Toca, 135 S. Ct. 1197 (2014) (No. 14-6381).
 See Id.
 Id. at 5.
 See People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 849 (Mich. 2014); State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 844 (La. 2013); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 331 (Minn. 2013); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. 2013).
 See generally Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
 Id. at 290.
 Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y Suffolk Cnty., 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013).
 Tate, 130 So. 3d at 837.
 See supra note 1.
 See Toca v. Louisiana, 141 So. 3d 265, cert. granted in part, 83 U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2014), subsequently dismissed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3647(U.S. Feb. 3, 2015) (No. 14–6381).
 Jonathan Kaminsky, George Toca Freed From Louisiana Prison After 30 Years, Huff. Post Crime (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/29/george-toca-freed-louisiana_n_6575764.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DJB7-WQBZ.
 Id. See supra note 1.
 See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 141 So. 3d 264 (La. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3149 (U.S. Sept. 5, 2014) (No. 14-280).
April 9, 2015
By Victoria A. Jowers, Senior Associate
On April 28, 2010, Joseph Perkins was an inmate at the Orleans Parish Prison (OPP) serving an 18-month sentence for robbery. On that day, Perkins was involved in a fight with other inmates. Following the fight, a prison guard searched Perkins. During the search, Perkins dropped two shanks by his side. Then, the OPP medical clinic treated Perkins for lacerations to his head, neck, arms, and chest.
Following the incident, the state charged Perkins with possession of a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies in violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:95.1. At trial, the deputy on duty at the time the fight broke out testified that he saw the two inmates accused of attacking Perkins standing across from one another holding shanks. A DNA expert testified that the blood on one of the shanks belonged to Perkins. Counsel for Perkins introduced evidence that Perkins was badly injured, requiring many stitches. On the basis of this evidence, Perkins requested that the jury receive self-defense and justification instructions. The state denied his request, and Perkins was convicted of violating Revised Statutes section 14:95.1. The state sentenced him to 15 years at hard labor.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court erred in denying Perkins the self-defense and justification instructions. Refuting the trial court’s opinion that there was no evidence suggesting that self-defense applied to Perkins’ case, the Fourth Circuit stated: “It is apparent that the wounds to the defendant were clearly visible and evident of defensive wounds.”
Then, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted a writ filed by Perkins. Although the Court acknowledged that Perkins likely grabbed the shanks from his attackers, the Court found that the Louisiana Legislature never intended for self-defense and justification to apply to a defendant who possessed a concealed weapon while incarcerated. Because Perkins was incarcerated when he grabbed the weapon, the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that Perkins was not entitled to justification or self-defense instructions. Thus, Perkins’ 15-year conviction for grabbing the weapon of his attacker stood.
I. Applicable Law
Under Louisiana law, self-defense and justification instructions are considered “special charges.” Special charges are jury instructions that the state or defendant can request be given in addition to the charged and lesser offense instructions required by Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure articles 814 and 815. Under Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 807, Louisiana law requires that a requested special charge instruction be given if “it does not require qualification, limitation, or explanation, and if it is wholly correct and pertinent.” Generally, courts have interpreted article 807 to mean that the charge must be both pertinent and supported by evidence presented at trial. This is part of a trial judge’s obligation to charge the jury according to the applicable law, covering every phase of the case supported by the evidence whether the judge accepts the evidence as true.
The special charge at issue in Perkins comes from Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 14:18–19. Revised Statutes section 14:18 provides that there are seven circumstances in which a defendant may raise a justification defense. Section 14:18(7) allows for a justification defense to be used in certain cases where one is defending oneself, others, or property. Specifically, Revised Statutes section 14:19 provides that the “self-defense” justification may be used when a person uses force or violence upon another to prevent force from being used against themselves, provided that the force is reasonable and necessary. This statutory defense codifies the legal doctrine of necessity, which provides that—in most cases—the existence of extenuating circumstances making the commission of a crime necessary will defeat criminal culpability. “‘Necessity,’ when raised as a defense to the illegal possession of a firearm, entails proof that the threat of force by another is imminent and apparent, and that the person threatened has no reasonable alternative but to possess the firearm.”
In State v. Blache, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that a justification defense could apply to a defendant charged, as Perkins was, with violating Revised Statutes section 14:95.1. In that case, a convicted felon grabbed his brother-in-law’s loaded shotgun after being attacked by a group of five individuals. In Blache, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
We hold that when a felon is in imminent peril of great bodily harm, or reasonably believes himself or others to be in such danger, he may take possession of a weapon for a period no longer than is necessary or apparently necessary to use it in self-defense, or in defense of others. In such situation [where a felon is or reasonably believes himself or others to be in imminent peril], justification is a defense to the charge of felon in possession of a firearm.
Citing Blache, the Fourth Circuit opined that because the evidence introduced at trial showed that Perkins had defensive injuries that “speak for themselves,” the justification and self-defense instructions were pertinent and supported by the evidence. Thus, according to the Fourth Circuit, the trial court erred in refusing to give the justification and self-defense instructions.
II. Louisiana Supreme Court Findings
When the Perkins case reached the Louisiana Supreme Court, the Court took a different approach than the approach followed in Blache. Rather than focusing on whether a felon is entitled to a justification or self-defense instruction when charged with a violation of Revised Statutes section 14:95.1, the Court focused on whether an incarcerated felon is entitled to a justification or self-defense instruction when charged with a violation of section 14:95.1. Discussing Blache, the Court stated that because in that case the weapon was capable of being legally possessed by someone and there was no evidence that the felon had illegally possessed the weapon prior to being attacked, the felon was entitled to the justification or self-defense instruction. Distinguishing Blache, the Court stated, “in the penal context, however, there is no scenario in which the possession of the ‘shank’ at issue here would be permissible.”The Court cited Louisiana Administrative Code section 22:I.341(I)(1), which prohibits inmates from possessing any weapons, and Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:402, which prohibits any person from possessing or introducing a dangerous weapon within prisons to support its reasoning. Based on these statutes, the Court concluded that the Louisiana Legislature never intended for a prisoner who possesses a weapon to be able to use the justification or self-defense instructions to defend his or her actions. Thus, because Perkins was incarcerated when he defended himself, the jury never had the opportunity to decide whether Perkins acted in self-defense. As a result, he is serving 15 extra years in prison.
Because Perkins ties a defendant’s rights to a special charge instruction to his incarceration status at the time of the alleged crime, the case opens the door for even greater challenges to attorneys who defend prisoners. The Court attempts to limit its reasoning to restricting justification and self-defense instructions in the context of inmates charged with violating Revised Statutes section 14:95.1. However, because the Court looked to legislative intent to decide an inmate defendant’s entitlement to a special charge instruction, the door has been opened for the state to argue that the Legislature never intended for a prisoner to avail himself of self-defense, justification, and other special charges when prisoner-defendants submit them. This marks a departure from the typical pertinence/ evidentiary support analysis for special charges. After this opinion, a prisoner’s ability to instruct the jury with special charges may be more limited than a non-incarcerated person’s right.
Lawyers who are defending prisoners should prepare themselves for the possibility that a court may deny a special charge jury instruction based on legislative intent. Although attorneys should continue to pursue special charges for prisoners, when crafting proposed jury instructions, it would be wise to consider what statutes and Department of Corrections regulations may be used to persuade a court that the Louisiana Legislature never intended that prisoners could avail themselves of that special charge. Pertinence and evidentiary support may no longer be the only concerns when requesting jury instructions on responsive verdicts.
Lastly, careful legislators should consider revising Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 14:18-19 to clarify whether or not it was intended for a prisoner to be able to avail themselves of justification and self-defense instructions. In Perkins, the Court looked to other statutes to determine legislative intent, likely due to the absence of information in sections 14:18-19 about what the legislature intended. If the Legislature did in fact intend for prisoners to use justification and self-defense instructions, this case provides an excellent outline of what needs to be changed in sections 14:18-19 to make sure they are afforded that opportunity.
 State v. Perkins, 120 So. 3d 912, 914–15 (La. Ct. App. 2013), writ granted, 135 So. 3d 626 (La. 2014), rev’d, 149 So. 3d 206 (La. 2014). The author references the appellate opinion for the purpose of giving the reader the facts, as the Louisiana Supreme Court opinion did not include a detailed statement of the facts.
 Id. at 914–15.
 Id. at 915. While the Fourth Circuit and the majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court did not elaborate on the manner in which Perkins turned over the shanks, Justice Hughes of the Louisiana Supreme Court characterized Perkins as having “voluntarily surrendered” the shanks. See State v. Perkins, 149 So. 3d 206, 209 (La. 2014) (Hughes, J., dissenting).
 Perkins, 120 So. 3d at 914.
 Id. at 913.
 Id. at 916.
 Id. The expert was unable to obtain a DNA profile from the other shanks.
 Id. at 918.
 Id. at 914, 916.
 Id. at 914.
 Id. at 918.
 State v. Perkins, 135 So. 3d 626 (La. 2014).
 State v. Perkins, 149 So. 3d 206, 207 (La. 2014).
 Id. at 207–09.
 See State v. Patterson, 473 So. 2d 363, 364 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
 See State v. Simmons, 817 So. 2d 16, 19 (La. 2002).
 La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 807 (2015).
 See, e.g., State v. Teleford, 384 So. 2d 347, 350 (La. 1980).
 La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 802 (2015).
 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:19(A)(2007).
 See State v. Recard, 704 So. 2d 324, 327–29 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing the doctrine of necessity at length).
 State v. Jackson, 452 So. 2d 776, 779 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
 State v. Blache, 480 So. 2d 304, 305 (La. 1985).
 Id. at 308.
 State v. Perkins, 120 So. 3d 912, 918–19 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
 Id. at 208–09 (emphasis added).
 State v. Perkins, 149 So. 3d 206, 209 (La. 2014).
 Id. at 209–10.
 Id. at 208.
 Id. at 208–10.
 Id. at 208–09.
 See, e.g., State v. Teleford, 384 So. 2d 347, 350 (La. 1980) (analyzing what is required for an instruction under article 807).
 See State v. Perkins, 149 So. 3d 206, 209 (La. 2014).