By John C. Witherington
Introduction
On March 26, 2024, shortly after 1:00 a.m. EDT, the container ship M/V DALI (Dali) headed out of the Baltimore Harbor down the Patapsco River on its way to its destination in Sri Lanka.[1] Twenty four minutes later, at 1:24 a.m. EDT, the Daliexperienced a power failure.[2] Three minutes later, at 1:27 a.m. EDT, the vessel allided with a pylon of the Francis Scott Key Bridge, administering a level of force equivelant to a rocket launch.[3] The federal government classified this bridge as “fracture critical,” meaning that if one part of the bridge collapsed, the rest would likely follow.[4] After being struck, nearly all of the bridge crumbled into the water in an instant.[5] Six people did not have time to evacuate the bridge and perished because of the collapse.[6] The extent of the damage remains uncertain because of its impact on numerous parties and its reach across a geographically wide area.[7] Demolition of the bridge began in July 2025, and the new bridge is not expected to be completed until 2028.[8]
I. Background
The Francis Scott Key Bridge has been an economic engine for the Baltimore area since it opened in March 1977.[9] “The fallen bridge was one of three highway routes traversing the Baltimore Harbor.”[10] On average, the bridge handled around 31,000 cars per day, equating to 11.3 million cars per year.[11] The roadway that crossed the bridge, Interstate-695, was an important alternate route for oversized vehicles that could not fit in the Baltimore Harbor tunnel.[12] It was also the alternate route for vehicles hauling hazardous materials that could not travel through the tunnel because of safety concerns.[13]
The Port of Baltimore is the seventeenth largest port in the United States, and there are around 15,000 workers who directly rely on port operations for employment.[14] According to the office of Maryland Governor Wes Moore, over 140,000 jobs are linked to port activity.[15] In 2023, the Port of Baltimore handled 847,158 cars and light trucks, marking its thirteenth year as the leading port in the United States for importing automobiles.[16]
The cost of rebuilding the bridge could be economically devastating. Though experts can only estimate, the collapse could cost insurers billions of dollars in claims, with one expert estimating up to $4 billion in losses on the high end.[17] According to Morningstar DBRS’s managing director for global insurance ratings, Marcos Alvarez, “insured losses could total between $2 billion and $4 billion” depending on the length of the blockage and the nature of business interruption in the port.[18] Even if damages are on the low end—$2 billion—“the economic disruption and pain experienced by businesses and individuals in Maryland and the Baltimore area will be widespread and likely take years to fully comprehend and compensate those affected.”[19] If experts are correct in their high-end $4 billion assessment, this tragedy would become a record loss for shipping insurance.[20]
Fortunately for the owners of the Dali, a piece of legislation from 1851 may shield them from having to pay $4 billion.[21] Under the Limitation Act of 1851, vessel owners who face a complaint of an incident involving their vessel can file a complaint-in-limitation in an appropriate court.[22] Once filed in the appropriate court, their liability may be capped at to the post-accident value of the ship plus the pending freight.[23] The Dali’s owners did exactly that, attempting to limit their liability to a mere $43.7 million.[24] After a vessel owner files such a complaint, claimants bring claims against the owners in a concursus proceeding.[25] The concursus enjoins all pending suits and compels claimants to file their claims in a single federal forum.[26]Once the claims are joined, the claimants must prove that the vessel owners were negligent or that the vessel was unseaworthy, and that negligence or unseaworthiness caused the wreck.[27] Therefore, determining fault is the initial inquiry. The owners are exonerated if there was no fault.[28] Alternatively, if the claimants prove causative fault because of negligence or unseaworthiness of the vessel, the court must next determine whether the negligence or unseaworthiness occurred with the owners’ “privity or knowledge.”[29] The second step reverses the burden of proof, and the owners have to prove that the negligence or unseaworthiness occurred without their “privity or knowledge.”[30] If the court finds that the owners did have “privity or knowledge” of the causal acts, the owners will not enjoy the benefits of the Limitation Act.[31] If the owners lacked “privity or knowledge” of the causal acts, the owners will be entitled to limit their liability, which would shield them from full liability for the damage their vessel caused.[32]
On October 24, 2024, the United States Department of Justice filed a joint notice of settlement that dismissed its claims against the Dali’s owners.[33] The settlement “resolve[d] the U.S. government’s claim for environmental cleanup and response costs and other damages under the Rivers and Harbors Act, Oil Pollution Act and general maritime law.”[34] The Oil Pollution Act displaces the Limitation Act, but the government’s claims under § 408 of the Rivers and Harbors Act are subject to limitation under the majority interpretation of the Limitation Act, and therefore, probably subject to limitation.[35] This settlement does not cover the cost of rebuilding the Francis Scott Key Bridge, which the state of Maryland maintained and for which it is still seeking compensation.[36] In addition, the settlement does not encompass the claims for personal injury and death brought by the deceased parties’ representatives.[37] As of August 4, 2025, the limitation proceeding is still ongoing as the Dali’s owners attempt to limit all other claims filed against them in the concursus proceeding.[38] The first trial date is set for June 1, 2026.[39]
This Blog argues that the Limitation Act needs to provide a larger monetary pool for plaintiffs to draw on if a vessel owner’s liability is limited. This monetary pool would be funded by the increased financial liability imposed on the vessel owners and their insurers involved in these incidents. The Francis Scott Key Bridge collapse is a tragedy that provides a much-needed catalyst for legislative reform. The collapse could cause up to $4 billion worth of damage, and the Dali’s owners may only be liable for $43.7 million worth of damage under the Limitation Act.[40] Still, $43.7 million is much less than the presumed insurance coverage of $3.1 billion provided by Protection and Indemnity (P&Ilubs.[41] Even if the owners are liable for more under the new methodology, they will likely be covered by the large P&I insurance clubs.
II. Analysis
The Limitation of Liability Act was enacted in the 19th century to protect vessel owners, but its framework no longer fits the realities of today’s modern shipping industry.[42] By tying liability to the post-accident value of a ship, the Act often leaves injured parties with far less compensation than what is needed to address their losses. A more practical and equitable approach would be to reform the Act by adopting a formula that multiplies a ship’s weight by a set dollar amount, similar to existing liability schemes in maritime and environmental law.
A. The Limitation Act Needs a Substantive Revision
The Limitation Act’s pool of money can be much smaller than what is needed to remedy aggrieved parties following a vessel accident, with one example being the Conception boat fire that killed 34 people where the owners tried to limit liability to $0 because the vessel sunk and was a “complete loss.”[43] The original reasons behind the Limitation Act are no longer appropriate in today’s well-established shipping industry.[44] The amount of marine insurance vessel owners purchase is usually enough to cover a higher monetary ceiling, and if owners do not buy enough insurance initially, they can do so later.[45]Assessing the value of the ship after it is involved in a collision—because the ship is valued post-voyage under the Limitation Act—creates a problem for plaintiffs seeking monetary compensation.[46] The vessel’s value would likely be depleted after a wreck. The proposed solution involves multiplying the weight of the ship by a dollar amount, the way the loss of life and personal injury parts of the Limitation Act do.[47]
B. The Formula
A dollar amount multiplied by the weight of the ship in tons would increase the monetary pool available for plaintiffs and may be easier for courts to apply than finding the value of a vessel after it has been involved in an accident. This formula is already seen in the Limitation Act for personal injury and wrongful death claims, along with other statutes regarding limitation of liability for non-maritime related incidents.[48] A helpful framework is the Oil Pollution Act of 1990’s limit on liability.[49] In this statute, the first step is to identify the type of vessel or facility involved in the accident.[50] Out of the vessels identified in the Oil Pollution Act, a tanker vessel is held to the highest amount of monetary liability, being potentially liable for $3,000 or $1,900 per gross ton of the tanker, depending on the type of tanker.[51] A tanker vessel is analogous to a container vessel, as they both carry massive amounts of cargo or oil, are very hard to slow down, and can cause mass damage when colliding with objects.[52]An amendment to the Limitation Act should categorize the type of ship involved and the weight of that ship, identify the relevant dollar amount pertaining to liability, and multiply the two numbers. This formula would also take care of the “pending freight” analysis because it converts the freight’s weight into tonnage.[53] Though it may be hard to frequently weigh a container vessel, or weigh a vessel after a wreck, this question of fact could be determined at trial.[54]
C. The Application
Applying the proposed theory to the Baltimore bridge collapse, the court would need to classify the Dali’s ship type and determine its weight at impact. The Dali was a Neo-Panamax vessel.[55] These vessels are among the largest vessels in the world.[56] According to the ship’s size, the court could classify the Dali as a Neo-Panamax ship because it could fit through the newly expanded Panama Canal.[57] The court should classify Neo-Panamax ships as ones that should be exposed to the highest level of liability because of the vessels’ size and potential to cause damage. This classification would be similar to the largest tanker in the Oil Pollution Act. The owners of these types of vessels should be responsible for the highest category of liability, $3,000. After courts determine that the vessel fits in the $3,000 category, the court’s analysis would move to the weight of the Dali. There is speculation as to the weight of the Dali at impact, but an article presumes that the Dali weighed around 195,000 metric tons when fully loaded.[58] Applying the aforementioned formula, $3,000 multiplied by 195,000 comes out to $585,000,000.[59] This amount would increase the pool of money that claimants would be entitled to by over 1,300% and would still be well under the presumed insurance coverage of $3.1 billion that P&I clubs cover.[60]
Conclusion
In light of the devastation caused by the Francis Scott Key Bridge collapse, it is clear that the Limitation Act of 1851 is ill-suited to address the scale of modern maritime incidents. The Act’s antiquated liability cap, based on the post-casualty value of a vessel and pending freight, severely undercuts the compensation available to victims and impacted parties. While the intent behind the Limitation Act was to protect fledgling shipping ventures from financial ruin, today’s maritime operations involve billion-dollar corporations with access to extensive insurance coverage and sophisticated risk management. Allowing such entities to limit liability to just a fraction of the damage they cause is not only unjust, but also erodes public confidence in maritime law and in the broader legal system’s ability to ensure accountability.
A reformed Limitation Act should incorporate a standardized, scalable formula for determining liability, reflecting the true risk posed by massive commercial vessels like the Dali. Multiplying a vessel’s weight by a fixed dollar amount based on its category, as proposed in this Blog, would provide a more equitable and predictable basis for compensating victims. Such a reform would preserve the Limitation Act’s core purpose of limiting runaway liability, while ensuring that the monetary pool available to injured parties is commensurate with the scale of harm caused. The Baltimore tragedy offers an urgent and highly visible opportunity for lawmakers to modernize this outdated statute and better align maritime liability with today’s commercial and social realities.
[1] Lisa Shumaker, Baltimore bridge collapse: What happened and what’s next?, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/why-did-baltimore-bridge-collapse-what-do-we-know-about-ship-2024-03-26/ [https://perma.cc/7L6W-TL5F] (updated Apr. 15, 2024).
[2] Id.
[3] Pylons are the critical load-bearing components of cable-supported bridges responsible for transmitting the loads from the cables to the bridge foundation. Id.; see also Aitish Bhatia & Francesca Paris, Force of Ship Impact Was on the Scale of a Rocket Launch, The N.Y. Times (Mar. 28, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/ 03/28/upshot/baltimore-bridge-ship-force.html [https://perma.cc/N6ZU-MR7U] (discussing the force it would have taken to stop the Dali).
[4] Brad Brooks, Collapse highlights need to protect critical foundations, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/u s/baltimore-bridge-collapse-highlights-need-protect-critical-foundations-2024-03-28/ [https://perma.cc/F4U7-DJJV] (updated Mar. 28, 2024).
[5] Shumaker, supra note 1.
[6] Id.
[7] See generally Sinead Cruise, Jonathan Saul & Carolyn Cohn, Insurers could face losses of up to $4 billion after Baltimore bridge tragedy, analyst says, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/insurers-brace-multi-billion-dollar-losses-after-baltimore-ship-tragedy-2024-03-27/ [https://perma.cc/8HUM-LK5H] (updated Mar. 28, 2024); see also Jana Byron, The Baltimore bridge collapse: a $4 billion question, Lockton (July 9, 2024), https://global.lockton.com/news-insights/the-baltimore-bridge-collapse-a-4-billion-question [https://perma.cc/S5H3-2S4L].
[8] Maryland Transportation Authority, Demolition Set to Begin as Maryland Transportation Authority Shares Key Bridge Rebuild Update (June 26, 2025), reproduced in Key Bridge Rebuild Press Releases (on file with MDTA).
[9] See Zephan Matteson, Matt Cohen & Andrew Mollenauer, Baltimore has averted economic crisis one year after Key Bridge collapse, Cap. News Serv. (Mar. 31, 2025), https://marylandmatters.org/2025/03/31/baltimore-averted-economic-crisis-one-year-after-key-bridge-collapse/; see also Christopher Beranito, Francis Scott Key Bridge History: See 1970’s Construction Photos, Md. Dep’t of Transp. (Mar. 19, 2025), https://mdta.maryland.gov/keybridgenews#:~:text= Construction%20on%20the%20Francis%20Scott,is%2010.9%20miles%20in%20length [https://perma.cc/5WNM-KNYX] (last visited Sep. 5, 2025).
[10] Shumaker, supra note 1.
[11] Id.
[12] Chloe Demrovsky, The Economic Impact Of The Baltimore Bridge Collapse Will Linger, Contributing To Inflation, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/chloedemrovsky/2024/03/26/the-economic-impact-of-the-baltimore-bridge-collapse-will-linger-contributing-to-inflation/ [https://perma.cc/83NG-7JHS] (updated Mar. 27, 2024, 11:36 AM).
[13] Id.
[14] Shumaker, supra note 1.
[15] Press Release, The Office of Governor Wes Moore, Governor Moore Announces New Port of Baltimore Cargo Records (Feb. 23, 2024) (on file with author).
[16] Id.
[17] Cruise, supra note 7; see also Byron, supra note 7.
[18] Cruise, supra note 7.
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] 46 U.S.C. §§ 30521–30.
[22] Dominic Dewey, Is Limitation of Liability an Illusion? Examining the Numbers and Current Trends of the Limitation Act Today, 23 Loy. Mar. L.J. 59, 65 (2024).
[23] The post-accident value of the ship and pending freight will be expanded on throughout this Blog. Id.
[24] Petition for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liab., In re the Petition of Grace Ocean Priv. Ltd. et al. for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liab., 1:24CV00941 (filed Apr. 1, 2024).
[25] Dewey, supra note 23, at 63.
[26] Id.
[27] Craig H. Allen, Limitation of Liability, 31 J. Mar. L. & Com. 263, 265–66 (2000).
[28] Exoneration occurs when the plaintiff-in-limitation is not at fault for the purported claim. When the claimants cannot prove fault by either negligence or unseaworthiness, the owner is exonerated and owes no liability. The court does not reach the question of the plaintiff-in-limitations “privity or knowledge” when the plaintiff-in-limitation is exonerated. See generally Bryan L. Adkins et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv., LSB11155, The Baltimore Bridge Collapse and the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (2024).
[29] Allen, supra note 28.
[30] Id.
[31] See generally Adkins, supra note 29.
[32] See generally 46 U.S.C. §§ 30521–30530.
[33] Proposed Settlement Order at 1, In re Grace Ocean Priv. Ltd., 24-CV-00941 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2024).
[34] Linda Chiem, DOJ Reaches $102M Deal In Baltimore Bridge Collapse Suit, Law360 (Oct. 24, 2024), https://www.law360.com/articles/2251457.
[35] The Oil Pollution Act “displacing” the Limitation Act means that claims brought under the Oil Pollution Act would not be subject to limitation under the Limitation Act due to the Oil Pollution Act having its own internal limitation scheme. James Coleman et al., Oil in the Sea III: Inputs, Fates, and Effects Appendix K. Regulatory Framework (Nat’l Acad. of Scis. 2003), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK220699/ [https://perma.cc/HX27-6ABW]; see also In re Am. River Transp. Co., 800 F.3d 428, 437 (8th Cir. 2015) (stating “[t]he in rem remedy inherently limits recovery for violations of § 408 [of the River and Harbors Act] to the value of the property, which is consistent with the Limitation Act’s standard limiting a vessel owner’s liability to the value of the ship and its freight”).
[36] Chiem, supra note 35.
[37] Id.
[38] See In re Grace Ocean Priv. Ltd., No. 24‑CV‑00941 (D. Md. Apr. 1, 2024).
[39] See Scott Maucione, First trial involving Key Bridge collapse in Baltimore to start in June 2026, WYPR News (Nov. 8, 2024, 10:29 AM), https://www.wypr.org/wypr-news/2024-11-08/first-trial-involving-key-bridge-collapse-in-baltimore-to-start-in-june-2026 [https://perma.cc/PJ2W-6RD8].
[40] Petition, In re Grace Ocean Private Ltd., No. 24-CV-00941 (Apr. 1, 2024); see also Cruise, supra note 7; see also Byron, supra note 7.
[41] P&I clubs are protection and indemnity clubs that insure and reinsure vessels. There are about a dozen P&I clubs that insure around 90% of the world’s oceangoing tonnage. Adam Tooze, Baltimore Insurance Claims & the Logic of Big Ships, Chartbook Newsl. (Mar. 30, 2024), https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/top-links-395-baltimore-insurance [https://perma.cc/QD5F-VX8Z].
[42] Dewey, supra note 23 at 62.
[43] See generally Edhat Staff, Conception Boat Owner Files Lawsuit to Limit Liability, EDHAT (Sep. 6, 2019, 5:58 AM), https://www.edhat.com/news/conception-boat-owner-files-lawsuit-to-limit-liability/ [https://perma.cc/E4LZ-GFA9]; see also Brian Melley, Boat owners seek to head off lawsuits after 34 die in fire, Associated Press (Sep. 5, 2019, 11:56 P.M.), https://apnews.com/article/d33314e1e77447cba3ca4f820e441370.
[44] The “reasoning” behind the Limitation Act was to promote investment in the shipping industry. See Dewey, supra note 23, at 62–63.
[45] Richard C. Reilly & Thomas Shumaker, What Does the Titanic Have To Do With the Francis Scott Key Bridge Collapse?, NYSBA (July 10, 2024), https://nysba.org/what-does-the-titanic-have-to-do-with-the-francis-scott-key-bridge- [https://perma.cc/LD25-KXRB] (stating that P&I clubs collectively buy reinsurance covering up to “$3.1 billion per ship”); see also Karen Shipman, Is the Limitation of Liability Act Going to Sink with the Deepwater Horizon?, Kean Miller: La. L. Blog (Jan. 3, 2011), https://www.louisianalawblog.com/admiralty-and-maritime/is-the-limitation-of-liability-act-going-to-sink-with-the-deepwater-horizon/ [https://perma.cc/EUB6-PY4G] (stating that “[t]he arguments against the Limitation Act being that the public policy behind the Limitation Act is antiquated and unnecessary because vessel owners today can readily procure liability insurance to protect themselves from damage claims caused by a vessel’s alleged unseaworthiness or negligence”).
[46] 46 U.S.C. § 30523.
[47] Id. § 30524.
[48] See id. § 30524(b).
[49] See 33 U.S.C. § 2704.
[50] See id. § 2704(a)(1)–(4).
[51] See id. § 2704(a)(1)(A)–(B).
[52] See generally Bhatia, supra note 3 (discussing the force it would have taken to stop the Dali).
[53] An alternative approach to “pending freight” would be to disregard it and take the sole weight of the ship without freight.
[54] The “lightweight” of a ship is the weight of the hull, machinery, and equipment on board. This measure is the weight of the ship without any cargo and should be fairly constant for most ships. The “deadweight” of a ship is the weight of cargo, fuel, and consumables stored on ship. The “deadweight” will fluctuate, and the final weight could be a question of fact at trial. In the formula proposed, the tonnage will be determined at the time the ship left port and embarked on the voyage that resulted in the wreck. Tonnage Measurements of Ships, S.S. Mut. (Aug. 9, 2010), https://www.steamshipm utual.com/publications/articles/articles/tonnage#:~:text=’Lightweight%20Ton’%20is%20the%20unit,the%20scrap%20value%20of%20ships [https://perma.cc/7PSL-3RPZ].
[55] Containership Size: The Panamax, DHL, https://www.dhl.com/content/dam/dhl/global/dhl-global-forw arding/documents/pdf/glo-dgf-cargo-sizes-infographic.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YR6-YB2X] (last visited Oct. 3, 2024).
[56] Container Ship: Definition, Types, and Design, inbound logistics (May 2023), https://www.inboundlogis tics.com/articles/container-ship/ [https://perma.cc/6MD9-5T5G].
[57] Id.; see also Jamie Rock, Addressing the M/V Dali Incident: Infrastructure, Trade and the Future of U.S. Maritime Policy, marinelink (Jan. 23, 2025), https://www.marinelink.com/news/addressing-mv-dali-incident-521457 [https://perma.cc/64VG-AUVX].
[58] See generally Bhatia, supra note 3 (speculating that the Dali weighed 195,000 metric tons).
[59] Id.
[60] P&I clubs are protection and indemnity clubs that insure and reinsure vessels. There are about a dozen P&I clubs that insure around 90% of the worlds oceangoing tonnage. Tooze, supra note 42.