By Shane Aucoin
Introduction
Louisiana’s Civil Service system is vital in preserving fairness and efficiency in state and local government operations.[1]Without this system, state and local government employees would be subject to discrimination and bias with no avenue for pursuing justice.[2] Civil Service cases have a unique appeal procedure designed to maintain fairness and efficiency.[3] This process is one of the rare occasions in which the Louisiana district courts exercise appellate jurisdiction.[4] A prominent goal of the Civil Service system is to achieve a fair balance of the government’s interests while also protecting state and local government employees.[5] After the Louisiana Supreme Court’s recent decision in Monroe Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board v. Brown (Brown), this balance appears to have impermissibly shifted, and the standards for these cases may have been confused.[6]The Brown decision may strip Louisiana district courts of a substantial portion of their unique appellate power in Civil Service cases.[7] Additionally, the Brown decision appears to conflate distinct processes of the Civil Service board and ignore decades of established law.[8]
I. Background
For the first 100 years of the United States’ existence, government employment was “an item of patronage,” and government employees could be hired or dismissed for any reason, even a discriminatory one.[9] After the assassination of President James Garfield in 1881, the “Civil Service reform” began, and a new system of government employment and protection was established.[10] Louisiana’s Civil Service regime provides a system where state and local government employers hire employees based on merit, and protect them from political or religious discrimination and from disciplinary actions taken without cause.[11] All state employees have Civil Service status unless a position is specifically exempted by law.[12] State employees who do not have Civil Service status are: “elected officials,” “city attorneys,” “members of state and city boards, authorities, and commission,” “members of the military or naval forces” and “teaching and professional staffs.”[13] Generally, an employee is considered a classified employee unless listed as an unclassified employee.[14]
Under Louisiana law, individuals holding permanent classified Civil Service positions have a recognized property interest in maintaining their employment.[15] Classified Civil Service employees may not be terminated without procedural due process.[16] Generally, due process requirements vary depending on the circumstances because of the imprecise nature of these situations.[17] “The essential requirements of due process . . . are notice and an opportunity to respond.”[18] “The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement.”[19]Civil Service protections apply only against termination or other disciplinary actions taken without cause.[20] Louisiana law established distinct Civil Service frameworks, each governing specific categories of employees or governmental entities.[21]
Municipalities with a population size of 13,000 to 250,000 are governed by the Municipal and Police Civil Service law.[22] Under this law, appointing authorities have the statutory power to discipline and terminate employees for cause.[23]Subsequently, affected employees can appeal the disciplinary action to the Civil Service board and assert that the disciplinary action was not taken “in good faith for cause.”[24] If an appointing authority acts “arbitrarily or capriciously,” the disciplinary action is without good faith.[25] When reviewing an appointing authority’s disciplinary action, “a Civil Service commission or board must decide not only if a disciplinary action has been made in good faith for cause, but additionally must make an independent assessment whether the particular punishment imposed is warranted.”[26] In essence, the board must make two distinct determinations: first, whether discipline is warranted, and second, whether the specific disciplinary action imposed is appropriate.[27]
Any employee or appointing authority may appeal from any decision of the Civil Service board.[28] The appeal from the Civil Service board takes place in the district court where the board is domiciled.[29] District courts have the exclusive right to review Civil Service board decisions on appeal unless supervisory writs are sought.[30] The standard for an appeal from the board is whether the board made its decision “in good faith for cause.”[31] Louisiana Revised Statutes section 33:2501 provides the exact same “in good faith for cause” standard in evaluating both the appointing authority’s disciplinary action and the Civil Service board’s decision.[32]
II. Monroe Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board v. Brown
In Brown, the Monroe Police Department terminated Officer Reginald Brown because of his conduct during an investigation of an excessive force incident.[33] On July 6, 2020, Timothy Williams filed an excessive force complaint against the Monroe Police Department alleging that Monroe police officers used excessive force when they arrested him.[34] Brown had been the interim police chief for approximately five months at the time Williams filed his excessive force complaint.[35] The day Williams filed the complaint, Brown learned there was bodycam footage showing a Monroe officer kicking “Williams in the head while Williams was lying face‑down on the street with his hands behind his back.”[36] Brown contacted the Monroe city attorney and, after consultation, placed both officers involved in the Williams complaint on administrative leave.[37]
The day the Williams complaint arrived, Brown contacted Monroe Mayor Mayo and informed him of the situation.[38]The next day, Brown instructed the internal affairs division to prepare paperwork to start the administrative investigation into the Williams excessive force complaint.[39] On Thursday, July 9, 2020, the Monroe city attorney called Brown to recommend he direct the investigation to the Louisiana State Police, but Brown declined to do so because the “investigation was already underway and could be handled by the department.”[40] The Monroe mayoral election was set to take place on Saturday, July 11, 2020, where Mayor Mayo was defeated.[41] The following Monday, Brown decided to direct the criminal investigation to the Louisiana State Police, but the state police declined to review the case.[42] The eventual criminal investigation resulted in the arrest of one of the Monroe officers.[43]
Once the new mayor took office, he appointed Eugene Ellis as the new interim police chief.[44] Brown returned to his original rank of corporal and was reassigned to the detective division.[45] On September 4, 2020, Chief Ellis informed Brown of an investigation into potential misconduct that took place during the Williams excessive force investigation and placed Brown on administrative leave.[46] Brown was ordered to submit to an interrogation by an attorney to discuss the timing of the mayoral election in relation to Brown’s decision to request a criminal investigation by the Louisiana State Police.[47] Brown was then ordered to submit to a two hour polygraph examination where there were only three “test” questions to be reviewed by the polygraph examiner.[48] The test questions tested Brown’s motive regarding the mayoral election and the subsequent directing of the criminal investigation to the state police.[49] The polygraph examiner concluded Brown’s answers were “deceptive” and indicated that Brown’s decision to delay the referral request was influenced by the impending mayoral election.[50]
Chief Ellis then ordered Brown to attend a “pre‑disciplinary hearing” because he failed a polygraph examination.[51]Before the hearing, the mayor appointed a permanent police chief, Victor Zordan, who was at the pre‑disciplinary hearing.[52] At the hearing, Brown stated he answered the polygraph truthfully, and the results were skewed because he was angry during the polygraph.[53] Chief Zordan fired Brown, citing that he failed the “properly administered” polygraph, falsely testified at the interrogation, falsely testified at the pre‑disciplinary hearing, and delayed sending the Williams excessive force investigation to the state police.[54]
A. The Board Appeal and Procedural Background
Brown appealed Monroe’s disciplinary action to the Monroe Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board (the Board), the Civil Service board responsible for reviewing disciplinary actions against Monroe firefighters and police officers.[55] After the Board heard evidence from both sides, the Board unanimously found the disciplinary action was taken against Brown “in good faith for cause, but the punishment [wa]s not commensurate with the offense.”[56] Based on this finding, the Board modified Brown’s dismissal to a 90‑day suspension without pay.[57]
The City of Monroe appealed the Board decision to the district court.[58] On appeal, the district court determined that the Board acted in good faith for cause but found the Board arbitrarily reduced Brown’s termination.[59] The district court reversed the Board’s modification of discipline and reinstated the appointing authority’s original decision to terminate Brown.[60] Brown appealed the district court’s ruling to the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal where the court found the district court lacked the authority to inquire into the Board’s modification of Brown’s punishment.[61] The Second Circuit reinstated the Board’s modification to a 90‑day suspension without pay.[62] The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in which the City of Monroe argued the Second Circuit erred in determining the district court lacked the power to alter the Board’s disciplinary decision once it found the Board acted in good faith and for cause.[63] Further, the City of Monroe contended the Board’s ruling was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by the evidence; therefore, it was not made in good faith for cause.[64]
B. The Court’s Analysis and Conclusions
The Court found the Second Circuit did not err in its decision to reinstate 90‑day suspension.[65] The Court reasoned, “the [Second Circuit] court of appeal recognized the [district] court found the [B]oard acted in good faith for cause . . . For that reason, the court of appeal correctly held the trial court erred by modifying the [B]oard’s discipline.”[66] Additionally, the Court found the Board had cause to discipline Brown, but that termination was “harsh” and “the [B]oard’s decision to reduce the discipline to a 90‑day suspension without pay was not arbitrary or capricious.”[67] Thus, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s judgment and the Board’s decision to reduce Brown’s termination to a 90‑day suspension without pay.[68]
III. Implications on Louisiana Civil Service Appeals
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Brown has many potential implications for the Civil Service appeal procedure.[69] The Court’s decision to uphold the Second Circuit may stand to strip the district courts of appellate power expressly granted by statute.[70] Additionally, the Court may have conflated the Board’s findings of good faith discipline and the Board’s findings regarding the appropriateness of the disciplinary action.[71] While many of the potential implications could be drastic and sweeping, the Brown opinion provides some much‑needed clarity regarding the standard applicable to appointing authorities and the Board.[72]
A. Brown’s Clarity on Standards
First, the Court provided some clarification on whether the appointing authority acted in “good faith.”[73] In addition to the comparison to the arbitrary and capricious standard, the Court provided, “[t]he prohibited conduct cited by the appointing authority must be the basis for the discipline. If the cited conduct is used only as a pretext for punishment motivated by impermissible grounds, the discipline was not taken in good faith.”[74] Second, the Court stated the board must afford substantial deference to the appointing authority’s choice of discipline.[75] Previous courts explained deference is owed to appointing authorities generally, but the Court clarified that deference is owed to the appointing authority’s actual choice of discipline.[76]While these clarifications are helpful, the remainder of the opinion should raise serious concerns about the Civil Service appeal procedure for the future.
B. Conflation of Board Decisions and Stripping District Court of Express Appellate Power
By affirming the Second Circuit’s judgment, the Louisiana Supreme Court may have stripped district courts of the power to review modifications of discipline made by Civil Service boards.[77] Municipalities and classified employees will both be affected if this implication turns into reality.[78] Police and firefighter Civil Service boards may have been granted unchecked power to modify an appointing authority’s disciplinary action with no avenue for review or appeal for the municipality or the employee if they take issue with the punishment.[79] Louisiana Revised Statutes section 33:2501(E)(1) is very clear in its command: “Any employee . . . and any appointing authority may appeal from any decision of the board, or from any action taken by the board . . . This appeal shall lie direct to the court of original and unlimited jurisdiction in civil suits of the parish wherein the board is domiciled.”[80] By affirming the Second Circuit’s judgment, the Court has conflated two decisions by the Board into one and has confused the issues, effectively denying district courts the power to review those decisions.[81]
By conflating the Board’s decision about whether the appointing authority had cause to discipline with the Board’s modification of the disciplinary action, the Court has effectively stripped district courts of the power to review a Civil Service board’s modification of disciplinary action.[82] In his concurrence, Justice Weimer stated:
Despite the court of appeal’s statement that the “district court determined that the Monroe Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board acted in good faith in imposing discipline,” nothing in the record indicates that the district court found that the discipline imposed by the board was in good faith for cause so as to preclude the district court from reviewing the board’s decision to modify Brown’s discipline. For these reasons, under the facts of this case, I believe the court of appeal erred in finding that the district court was without authority to inquire “into the Board’s choice of disciplinary penalty.”[83]
Since the district court never ruled the modification was in good faith for cause, the Court’s ruling essentially changes the standard—if a reviewing district court finds a Civil Service board was in good faith for cause to discipline an employee, then the district court cannot review any further.[84] The Court’s ruling gives the Civil Service boards unchecked modification power so long as the board acts in good faith for cause to discipline.[85] The Court appears to have merged the board’s two distinct determinations—whether discipline was imposed in good faith for cause and whether the punishment was commensurate with the offense—into a single inquiry, eliminating any meaningful avenue for review when a board alters the type of discipline originally imposed.[86]
The Court’s conflation of the separate and distinct board decisions prevents reviewing district courts from inquiring further if they find discipline was warranted.[87] The Court recently expressed concerns about lower courts conflating duty and scope of duty in the context of negligence cases. Conversely, in the Civil Service context, the Court does the exact thing it cautioned against and conflates the board’s decision to discipline and the board’s choice of discipline into one decision.[88] This conflation of the board’s decisions cuts out a substantial portion of the district court’s power to review Civil Service cases even though it is expressly granted by statute.[89] In his concurrence, Justice Weimer also stated:
Pursuant to La. R.S. 33:2501(C)(1) and (E)(3), the board’s decisions as to both the need for disciplinary action and modification of the sanction imposed are reviewable by the district court (which sits at an appellate court in these proceedings) and other reviewing courts (such as the court of appeal) . . . In the absence of a finding by the district court that the board’s modification of the discipline imposed was in good faith for cause, I believe the court of appeal legally erred in finding that the district court exceeded its scope of authority under La. R.S. 33:2501(E)(3) by analyzing the specific discipline/sanction imposed by the board.[90]
As previously mentioned, the board is charged with making independent assessments regarding: (1) the imposition of discipline and (2) whether the type of disciplinary action is commensurate.[91] Now, district courts must review these independent assessments as one decision, even if the modified discipline is in no way commensurate with the offense.[92] While the long‑term implications of the Court’s opinion are not yet known, there will likely be litigation over this exact subject.[93]
Conclusion
The Court’s decision in Brown may preclude a substantial portion of district courts’ appellate power expressly granted by statute.[94] Under Brown, when a Civil Service board has “good faith for cause” to discipline an employee, the board may modify the decision in anyway it wants despite the charge on the board to ensure the discipline is commensurate.[95] The Court has potentially rendered useless its previous rulings regarding discipline being commensurate with offense.[96] At some point, the Court should revisit this issue and properly dispose of its previous rulings so the new change in the law is not in conflict with the Court’s previous rulings on the subject.
[1] See generally La. Dep’t of Ag. & Forestry v. Sumrall, 728 So. 2d 1254, 1262 (La. 1999).
[2] See generally Bannister v. Dep’t of Sts., 666 So. 2d 641, 645 (La. 1996).
[3] See generally La. Rev. Stat. § 33:2501(E)(2).
[4] Id. Appellate jurisdiction is the power of a court to review and revise the decisions of the lower courts. See generally id. In the Civil Service context, appellate jurisdiction is the power of the district courts to review administrative decisions by a Civil Service Board. See generally id. The Louisiana Constitution provides: “A district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by law.” La. Const. art. 5, § 16. District courts also have appellate jurisdiction over appeals from justice of the peace courts. See generally La. Rev. Stat. § 13:2561.17. “[F]or the purpose of judicial review of administrative action, district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and only have appellate jurisdiction to review administrative decisions as provided by the legislature or constitution.” Metro Riverboat Assocs., Inc. v. La. Gaming Control Bd., 797 So. 2d 656, 660 (La. 2001) (citing Loop, Inc. v. Collector of Revenue, 523 So. 2d 201, 203 (La. 1987)).
[5] New Orleans Firefighters Ass’n Local 632, AFL-CIO v. City of New Orleans, 590 So. 2d 1172, 1175 (La. 1991).
[6] Monroe Mun. Fire & Police Civ. Serv. Bd. v. Brown, 417 So. 3d 547, 559 (La. 2025).
[7] See generally id.; La. Rev. Stat. § 33:2501(E)(1).
[8] See Brown, 417 So. 3d at 559 (Weimer, J., concurring).
[9] See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 148 (1974).
[10] See id. at 148–49.
[11] Bannister v. Dep’t of Sts., 666 So. 2d 641, 645 (La. 1996). “Essentially, civil service laws and rules establish a system under which ‘non-policy forming’ public employees are selected on the basis of merit and can be discharged only for insubordination, incompetency, or improper conduct, and not for religious or political reasons.” Id. (citing New Orleans Firefighters Ass’n v. Civ. Serv. Com’n of New Orleans, 422 So. 2d 402 (La. 1982)).
[12] See La. Const. art. 10, § 2(A)–(B); Wallace v. Shreve Mem’l Libr., 79 F.3d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1996).
[13] La. Const. art. 10, § 2(B)(1), (3), (5), (8)–(9).
[14] See id. art. 10, § 2(A)–(B). “Persons not included in the unclassified service are in the classified service.” id. art. 10, § 2(A). Police officers are classified civil service employees. See id. art. 10, §(A)–(B).
[15] See Wallace, 79 F.3d at 431 (citing Bell v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 483 So. 2d 945, 949–50 (La. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827 (1986)).
[16] LaPointe v. Vermilion Par. Sch. Bd., 173 So. 3d 1152, 1158 (La. 2015) (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 (1976)).
[17] Williams v. Bd. of Supervisors, La. Cmty. & Tech. College Sys., 272 So. 3d 84, 89 (La. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Lange v. Orleans Levee Dist., 56 So. 3d 925, 930 (La. 2010)). “[D]ue process is not a technical concept with a fixed content unrelated to the time, place and circumstances.”
[18] Williams, 272 So. 3d at 89 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985)).
[19] Williams, 272 So. 3d at 89 (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546).
[20] Ruddock v. Jefferson Par. Fire Civ. Serv. Bd., 688 So. 2d 112, 114 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Chief of Police for Kenner v. Trippi, 499 So. 2d 1177, 1180 (La. Ct. App. 1986)).
[21] La. Rev. Stat. § 33:2471 et seq. Municipalities with populations are under 13,000 are subject to the Fire and Police Civil Service Law for small municipalities. See id. § 33:2531 et seq.
[22] La. Rev. Stat. § 33:2471 et seq.
[23] Id. § 33:2500(A)(1)–(15).
[24] Id. § 33:2501(A)–(B)(1).
[25] Moore v. Ware, 839 So. 2d 940, 945 (La. 2003).
[26] City of Bossier City v. Vernon, 100 So. 3d 301, 311 (La. 2012).
[27] See id.
[28] La. Rev. Stat. § 33:2501(E)(1).
[29] Id.; Ware, 839 So. 2d at 945.
[30] See Touchette v. City of Rayne, Mun. Fire & Police Civ. Serv. Bd., 321 So. 2d 62, 63 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
[31] La. Rev. Stat. § 33:2501(E)(3).
[32] See id. § 33:2501(A).
[33] Monroe Mun. Fire & Police Civ. Serv. Bd. v. Brown, 417 So. 3d 547, 549 (La. 2025). In particular, the issue of whether Brown lied during the investigation was an important consideration in the decision to fire him. Id.
[34] Brown, 417 So. 3d at 550.
[35] Id.
[36] Id.
[37] Id.
[38] Id.
[39] Id.
[40] Id.
[41] Id.
[42] Id.
[43] Id. at 551.
[44] Id.
[45] Id.
[46] Id.
[47] Id.
[48] Id.
[49] Id.
[50] Id.
[51] Id.
[52] Id.
[53] Id. at 551–52.
[54] Id. at 552.
[55] Id. at 550–52.
[56] Id. at 553.
[57] Id.
[58] Id.
[59] Id.
[60] Id.
[61] Id. “Once the district court determined that the [Board] acted in good faith in imposing discipline upon Reginald Brown, no further inquiry by the district court into the Board’s choice of disciplinary penalty was appropriate under the law.” Id.
[62] Brown, 417 So. 3d at 553.
[63] Id. at 556.
[64] Id. at 557.
[65] Id. at 556–57.
[66] Id. at 557.
[67] Id. at 558.
[68] Id. at 558–59.
[69] See generally id. at 557–59.
[70] See generally id. at 557.
[71] See id. at 560 (Weimer, J., concurring).
[72] See generally id. at 555.
[73] Id. at 554.
[74] Id. at 554–55.
[75] Id. at 555.
[76] See generally Mathieu v. New Orleans Pub. Libr., 50 So. 3d 1259, 1268 (La. 2010); Brown, 417 So. 3d at 555.
[77] See generally Brown, 417 So. 3d at 557.
[78] See generally id.
[79] See generally id.
[80] La. Rev. Stat. § 33:2501(E)(1) (emphasis added).
[81] See generally Brown, 417 So. 3d at 561 (Weimer, J., concurring).
[82] See generally id. at 559–61 (Weimer, J., concurring).
[83] Id. at 561 (Weimer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
[84] See generally id.
[85] See generally id.
[86] See generally id.
[87] See generally id.
[88] See generally id.
Some cases conflate “duty” with the “scope of duty,” while others use the concepts interchangeably. This is problematic as the duty/risk analysis breaks down into separate considerations: duty and scope of duty. Each is a necessary component for the imposition of tort liability and is to be considered independently of the other.
Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels La., Inc., 403 So. 3d 573, 580 (La. 2025) (emphasis added). Drawing an inference by comparison, the Court has taken a stance against conflating elements of analysis in any action when they are clearly distinct analyses and elements. See generally id.
[89] See generally La. Rev. Stat. § 33:2501(E)(1).
[90] Brown, 417 So. 3d at 561–62 (Weimer, J., concurring) (citing Evans v. DeRidder Mun. Fire, 815 So. 2d 61, 66 (La. 2002); Alexandria v. Dixon, 196 So. 3d 592, 598–99 (La. 2016)) (emphasis added).
[91] See City of Bossier City v. Vernon, 100 So. 3d 301, 311 (La. 2012).
[92] See generally Brown, 417 So. 3d at 559.
[93] See generally id. at 561 (Weimer, J., concurring).
[94] See generally La. Rev. Stat. § 33:2501(E)(1); Brown, 417 So. 3d at 556–57.
[95] See generally Brown, 417 So. 3d at 556–57; City of Bossier City v. Vernon, 100 So. 3d 301, 311 (La. 2012).
[96] See generally Brown, 417 So. 3d at 559–60 (Weimer, J., concurring).