Volume 86 Junior Associates Announced!

The Louisiana Law Review Board of Editors and Senior Associates are proud to announce the 25 students selected to serve as Junior Associates for Volume 86.

The Volume 86 Junior Associates are:  

Julia Bankard

Kaley Baronne

Kendal Bradley

Ransom Clifton

Brittany Corken

Emma DeLee

William Ensminger

Jonathan Farnet

Jackson Gregory

Eric Guidry

Asa Hausner

Brogunn Huffmaster

Zachary Joyner

Ethan Kennedy

Anna Kate Krieger

Blake LeBlanc

Ella Millet

Joshua Morris

Emily Phelps

Ashleigh Rhodes

Mason Smith

Madeleine Stout

Thomas Turkett

Kenzie Vickers

Thomas Wilmore

Congratulations to all!

Louisiana Law Review Volume 86 Board Announced!

The Louisiana Law Review Volume 85 Board of Editors is proud to announce the Junior Associates selected to serve on the Volume 86 Board of Editors. The Volume 85 Board received excellent candidates for the Volume 86 Board, and we thank everyone who applied. Serving on the Louisiana Law Review Board of Editors is an incredible honor, and we wish the best of luck to the Volume 86 Board!

 

Editor-in-Chief

Rachael Youngblood

 

Managing Editor

Sophie Gendron

 

Articles Editors

Amelia Dittmar

Margaret Tullis

 

Production Editors

Taylor Toups

Savannah Weisensee

 

Online Editor

Isabella Rovere

 

Executive Senior Editor

Olivia Grice

 

Senior Editors

John Brainard

Olivia Hebert

Joseph Kehrli

Noah Williams

Junior Associates Selected for Publication in Volume 86 Announced!

The Louisiana Law Review Volume 85 Board of Editors is proud to announce the Junior Associates selected for publication in Volume 86. The decision process was extremely difficult this year because of the number of well-written student pieces.

Shane Aucoin – Mapping the Future: How State Legislatures Should Restrict Reverse-Location Searches after United States v. Smith

 

John Paul Bourgeois – Behind the Screens: Comprehensive Consumer Privacy Laws as Louisiana’s Solution to the Battle Between Profit and Privacy

 

John Brainard – Tesla’s Forced Middleman: Why Modernization in hte Automobile Industry Requires Louisiana to Revise its Direct Sales Law

 

Olivia Grice – From Clicks to Claims: Redifining Products Liability in the Amazon Era

 

Joseph Kehrli – For Pete’s Sake: A Comparative Analysis on Quantum Review After Pete v. Boland

 

Joseph Mengis – The Safe Assumption: Revising the Duty Standard for Deisgn Professionals in Louisiana Construction Litigation

 

Daniel Paisant ­– The Applicability of Comparative Fault in Contract-Based Actions: A Louisiana Circuit Split 

 

Jacob Palkowski – A New Day in the Office for Collegiate Athletes: College Athletes May Gain Recongition as Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act

 

Christopher Quina ­– The Corporate Transparency Act: Navigating Constitutional Limits and Feeral Interests in the Wake of Nat’l Small Bus. United v. Yellen

 

Isabella Rovere ­– Do We Trust Big Oil: Navigating Antitrust Concerns in Oil and Gas Mergers & Acquisitions

 

Melisse Speligene – When Laws Leave You Hanging: Negotiorum Gestio Steps in for Self v. BPX Operating Co.

 

Abby Talbot – The Open and Obvious Doctrine: Putting a “Figment of Judicial Imagination” Back into Its Rightful Place

 

William Jacob Voitier – Vested Property Rights: Examining the Louisiana Supreme Court’s Approach to Substantive Due Process in Bienvenu v. Defendant 1

 

Noah Williams – Underground or Under My Ground: The Potential for Subsurface Trespass Actions Caused by Carbon Capture and Storage Operations in Texas

 

Sydney Wright – Thawing the Bayou: Melting Away Noncompetes and Their Chilling Effect on Job Mobility in Louisiana

 

Rachael Youngblood – I Knew You Were Trouble: Deepfakes, Misinformation, and the Threat to Elections 

The Cutting Edge: Louisiana’s New Surgical Castration Law

By James LeDoux  

Introduction 

What do Madagascar, the Czech Republic, Kaduna State in Nigeria, and Louisiana have in common? While it may be tempting to point to festive traditions like Mardi Gras, the connection is more sobering: each of these jurisdictions has, at some point, enacted or permitted laws authorizing surgical castration as a penalty for individuals convicted of certain sexual offenses, including rape.[1] In June 2024, Governor Jeff Landry signed Act 651, Louisiana’s surgical castration law, which went into effect on August 1, 2024.[2] Since its enactment, this new punishment has caused controversy among the legal community and activist groups. If—or when—a claim is brought under this statute, opposers will undoubtedly meet it with a multitude of challenges.[3]

I. Background and Legislative History

According to the Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault, one in four girls and one in six boys will suffer sexual abuse or misconduct by his or her 18th birthday.[4] Consequently, Senator Regina Barrow of Baton Rouge and Representative Delisha Boyd of New Orleans co‑authored the Bill enacting a new surgical castration punishment.[5] The Bill sought to correct the past failure of state law to protect children from sexual crimes.[6] The Bill passed all of Louisiana’s legislative chambers with at least 70% voting in the Bill’s favor at each level.[7] Given this high percentage, it is safe to say that the legislature heavily favored this law.

Louisiana’s surgical castration law may trigger questions involving the details of surgical castration and why it is controversial.[8] Louisiana law has allowed a chemical castration punishment since 2008, but courts rarely apply it.[9] Chemical castration uses pharmaceutical drugs to halt the offender’s sex drive without permanently ending it.[10] In contrast, surgical castration is more extreme as it involves the removal of the testicles or ovaries to stop the production of sex hormones.[11] This procedure greatly diminishes a person’s sex drive as the testicles or ovaries are no longer present to produce sex hormones.[12] Though tenuous, evidence shows that a diminished sex drive decreases the likelihood of the past perpetrator committing a sexual offense.[13] Louisiana legislators wrote and enacted this law to deter sex offenders from committing sexual offenses against minors by instilling fear of such an extreme punishment.[14]

Louisiana’s surgical castration law begins by asserting that if any person is convicted of certain sex offenses when the victim is under 13 years old at the time of the offense, the court may sentence the offender to be surgically castrated, on top of any other sentence imposed for the crime.[15] This statute applies to aggravated sex offenses defined under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 15:541, including aggravated rape, first‑degree rape, forcible rape, second‑degree rape, and simple rape.[16] The law further states that the Department of Public Safety and Corrections shall provide and administer the surgery using a licensed physician to perform the procedure.[17]

Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:43.7 then declares that a sentence of surgical castration is contingent upon a court‑appointed medical expert’s determination that the offender is an appropriate candidate for the procedure.[18] The statute’s language itself does not require surgical castration when it is not medically appropriate.[19] The medical expert must make this determination within 60 days from the judge’s imposition of the sentencing.[20] Currently, there are no standards, factors, or burdens or proof to determine when surgical castration is medically appropriate.

Furthermore, § 14:43.7 asserts that this procedure must be performed no later than one week before the offender’s release from his or her correctional institution.[21] Importantly, § 14:43.7 contains a provision that essentially gives the offender a choice between having the procedure or serving more time in prison.[22] The statute states that if an offender fails to appear for his or her court‑ordered procedure, he or she shall be charged with violating this statute and upon conviction shall be sentenced to a minimum of three years and a maximum of five years imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.[23] The new statute ends by declaring that its provisions do not apply to offenders under the age of 17.[24]

II. Other Sovereigns with Surgical Castration

As mentioned earlier, there are three other sovereigns in the world that currently have surgical castration laws in place for sex offenders. The first to enact such a law was the Czech Republican government in 1966.[25] The Czech Republic’s law stipulates that an offender may be surgically castrated only on a voluntary basis.[26] The Czech Republic’s Ministry of Health oversees the process and must properly inform the applicant–offender of the operation, including its side effects.[27] Lastly, a panel of at least five members—including two doctors specializing in the appropriate field, a lawyer, and two other non‑specialized doctors—must approve the procedure.[28] The offender must be at least 18 years old and medically diagnosed with deviant sexual behavior associated with tendencies to commit sexually motivated offenses.[29]

In 2020, the Kaduna State in Nigeria was the next sovereign to pass a surgical castration law.[30] Kaduna’s law is notable because castration is not the offender’s only punishment—the government also will sentence the offender to death under certain circumstances.[31] Further, the law applies to offenders convicted of a broad range of sex offenses, not just those against minors.[32] For example, the law mandates surgical castration and the death penalty for anyone who rapes a child under the age of 14; surgical castration and the death penalty for offenders who engage in sexual intercourse—seemingly including statutory rape—with a male child under 14; surgical castration and the death penalty for women who rape a child; and surgical castration and life imprisonment for anyone convicted of raping a person over the age of 14.[33]

The last sovereign to pass a surgical castration law before Louisiana was Madagascar.[34] Though the Parliament passed the law in February 2024, it will be effective only when the President signs it into law.[35] Similar to Kaduna’s law, Madagascar’s version includes different sentences for rape, depending on the age of the victim.[36] First, the law sentences an offender who rapes a child under the age of 10 to mandatory surgical castration.[37] Second, the law sentences an offender who rapes a child between the ages of 10 and 13 to chemical or surgical castration.[38] Finally, the law sentences an offender who rapes a child between the ages of 14 and 17 to chemical castration.[39]

While some may view the laws of Louisiana and these other jurisdictions as severe, others regard them as justified measures aimed at preventing recidivism among sex offenders and deterring potential first-time offenses.[40] Since 1950, medical and scholarly groups in multiple countries have conducted tests to determine the effectiveness of surgical castration on sex offender recidivism.[41] A team of scholars compiled the data from these tests, which is reproduced below.[42]

The compilation’s 2,300-subject sample size is large enough to provide statistical support.[43] The highest recidivism rate for a group of sex offenders after surgical castration was 10% out of 21 subjects, while the lowest was 0% out of 60 subjects.[44] In contrast, the highest recidivism rate for a group of sex offenders who were not castrated was 52% out of 50 subjects, while the lowest was 36% out of 22 subjects.[45] Despite ongoing debate surrounding the practice, these statistics suggest that surgical castration may be effective in achieving its intended purpose.[46]

III. Challenges Louisiana’s New Law May Face

Opponents of § 14:43.7 will almost certainly challenge its constitutionality if or when it is enforced and have multiple legal avenues to do so.[47] Challengers might attack the statute’s vagueness, specifically the way in which a judge and medical expert may determine if an offender is to receive the surgery.[48] As mentioned earlier, the new law’s language states that only those a court‑appointed medical expert deems an “appropriate candidate” will be forced to receive the punishment, but fails to list any criteria or standards under which the expert is meant to operate.[49] An opponent to § 14:43.7 will also likely challenge the statute as vague under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution’s Due Process Clause, which is extended to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.[50] To avoid vagueness under the Fifth Amendment, the law must be sufficiently clear so that those enforcing the law cannot act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.[51] In other words, the law cannot invite the judge or any others to interpret or apply the law with unchecked discretion.[52] With § 14:43.7, a challenger could argue that the language “appropriate candidate” is too vague and allows the medical expert or court too much freedom in determining if an offender is to be surgically castrated.[53] If a court finds this language to be unconstitutionally vague, it will likely strike down § 14:43.7.

If the opponents to § 14:43.7 do not prevail with the vagueness challenge, they will likely move on to the more obvious argument. Opponents often challenge the constitutionality of a crime’s  punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.[54] The Eighth Amendment states, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”[55] The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extends the Eighth Amendment to the states, and plaintiffs generally use both to challenge harsh criminal punishments.[56] Therefore, a challenge to a surgical castration law will likely invoke the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment.”[57] In Louisiana, the courts hold that a punishment is cruel and unusual if it is “barbarous, extraordinary or grossly disproportionate to the offense, those that shock the conscience of civilized men.”[58] This burden of proof falls on the plaintiff, who must prove that the punishment subjects him or her to “unreasonable risks and hazards,” thereby violating the Eighth Amendment. [59]

Even though neither the United States Supreme Court nor a Louisiana court has determined if a surgical castration law is unconstitutional, laws that provide similar punishments have not received favorable judicial treatment.[60] The U.S. Supreme Court held a statute providing for the sterilization of criminals unconstitutional for violating due process rights when applied to a habitual criminal convicted for stealing chickens and armed robbery.[61] A Nevada district court held that a statute authorizing vasectomies on male sex offenders constituted cruel and unusual punishment.[62] An Iowa district court held the same, finding its vasectomy law for men convicted of any second felony to be unconstitutional.[63] On the other hand, no court has held that chemical castration is cruel and unusual punishment.[64] Supporters of a surgical castration law may argue that the United States enforces harsher punishments than surgical castration, such as the death penalty.[65] Louisiana and 20 other states have the death penalty as a criminal punishment, including the use of lethal injection, gas inhalation, electrocution, and even a firing squad.[66] These laws have yet to be struck down as cruel and unusual punishments, which presents the argument that if enforcing the death penalty in these ways avoids the Eighth Amendment’s reach, then surgical castration should also not violate the Eighth Amendment.[67]

Conversely, some could argue that the death penalty is a punishment fitting the crime, while surgical castration is too extreme to fit certain rape crimes. Many believe that capital punishment is the proper punishment for murders: because the criminal takes a human life, he or she should lose the right to his or her life.[68] With the new statute, some may argue that the government removing the offender’s reproductive organs is too extreme to fit any rape crime, as the crime does not physically remove any organs like surgical castration.[69]

Conclusion

It might take years to see the effects of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:43.7, as its future is uncertain. There is no consistent data or evidence proving this new punishment will be 100% effective in preventing sex offenders from re‑offending.[70]  Further, it remains unclear whether a sentencing judge or jury will even apply surgical castration before a court declares it unconstitutional. Only time will tell whether the law will achieve its intended impact. In the meantime, the Louisiana legislature may hope that enforcing surgical castration will advance its policy goal of protecting children by preventing the commission of aggravated sexual offenses.

[1] See La. Rev. Stat. § 14:43.7 (2024); see also Adekunle Rasak, UPDATE: Rapists Now for Castration as Kaduna Gov Signs Penal Code into Law, Nigerian Trib. (Sep. 16, 2020), https://tribuneonlineng.com/update-rapists-now-for-castration-as-kaduna-gov-signs-penal-code-into-law/ [https://perma.cc/79Q6-JRAM]; Sarah Tetaud, Madagascar Law Allowing Castration of Child Rapists Prompts Criticism From Rights Groups, AP News (Feb. 11, 2024, 1:04 PM), https://apnews.com/article/madagascar-castration-law-andry-rajoelina-rape-criticism-d5efb32b72e48929f95fae1e6d7baefd [https://perma.cc/55J6-TBHB]; Leo Cendrowicz, The Unkindest Cut: A Czech Solution for Sex Offenders, Time (Feb. 11, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://time.com/archive/6945671/the-unkindest-cut-a-czech-solution-for-sex-offenders/ [https://perma.cc/FT4P-YFTQ].

[2] Act. No. 651, 2024 La. Acts (codified at La. Rev. Stat. § 14:43.7 (2024)).

[3] Jeff Horchak, Louisiana’s New Surgical Castration Law Takes Effect, Fox News 15 (Aug. 1, 2024), https://www.kadn.com/news/investigates/louisianas-new-surgical-castration-law-takes-effect/article_b4d965c8-505c-11ef-9489-f3dd4d0149e2.html [https://perma.cc/YFP9-22WV].

[4] Child Sexual Abuse, Lamothe L. Firm, https://lamothefirm.com/child-sexual-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/WW33-AN67].

[5] Horchak, supra note 3.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Jaclyn Diaz, What to Know About Louisiana’s New Surgical Castration Law, NPR (July 1, 2024, 5:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/2024/07/01/nx-s1-5020686/louisiana-new-surgical-castration-law [https://perma.cc/487H-Z6LB].

[11] Surgical Castration, Nat. Cancer. Inst., https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/surgical-castration [https://perma.cc/BSZ2-EJHN].

[12] Sandra G. Boodman, Does Castration Stop Sex Crimes? An Old Punishment Gains New Attention, but Experts Doubt Its Value, Wash. Post (Mar. 16, 1992), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/wellness/1992/03/17/does-castration-stop-sex-crimes/34bf63ee-840c-41e4-9c5f-5ac1bcf95b15/ (positing that some men will still be able to have an erection and may even be capable of sexual intercourse).

[13] John McMillan, The Kindest Cut? Surgical Castration, Sex Offenders and Coercive Offers, 40 J. Med. Ethics 583, 584 (2013).

[14] Horchak, supra note 3.

[15] La. Rev. Stat. § 14:43.7 (A) (2024).

[16] Id. § 15:541 (2024). Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:43.7 specifically excludes sexual battery under § 14:43.1(C)(2) and second‑degree sexual battery under § 14:43.2. Aggravated and first-degree rape are the same under § 14:42 and essentially include anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse when the victim orally or physically attempts to refuse the attacker. Forcible rape and second-degree rape are the same under § 14:42.1 and essentially include anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse when the victim does not give consent because he or she believes refusing will be to no avail as he or she is under a threat of violence or  because he or she is under the influence of some drug administered by the attacker. Simple and third-degree rape are the same under § 14:43 and essentially include  anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse when the victim cannot give consent due to being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, unsoundness of mind, or because he or she believes the person committing the act is someone other than the person actually committing the act.

[17] La. Rev. Stat. § 14:43.7 (A) (2024).

[18] Id. § 14:43.7 (B)(1) (2024).

[19] Id. § 14:43.7 (C) (2024).

[20] Id. § 14:43.7 (B)(1) (2024).

[21] Id. § 14:43.7 (B)(2) (2024).

[22] Id. § 14:43.7 (B)(3) (2024).

[23] Id.

[24] Id. § 14:43.7 (D) (2024).

[25] Alexis Rosenzweig & Jan Richter, Should the Czech Republic Stop Surgically Castrating Sex Offenders?, Radio Prague Int’l (Mar. 3, 2009), https://english.radio.cz/should-czech-republic-stop-surgically-castrating-sex-offenders-8586954 [https://perma.cc/EQX2-PFNE]; Voislav Stojanovski, Surgical Castration of Sex Offenders and Its Legality: The Case of the Czech Republic, Masaryk Univ., at 11, https://www.iusetsocietas.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/Vitezne_prace/Stojanovski.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9US-JNT8] (the law was enacted through Zákon č. 20/1966 Sb. (Coll.) (Czech)).

[26] Stojanovski, supra note 25, at 11–12.

[27] Id. at 12.

[28] Id.

[29] Id.

[30] Rasak, supra note 1.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Id. The section that includes women who rape a child does not specify an age the child must be; the law only says “child.” See id.

[34] Tetaud, supra note 1.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Id.

[40] See id.; see also Horchak, supra note 3.

[41] Linda Weinberger, Shoba Sreenivasan, Thomas Garrick & Hadley Osran, The Impact of Surgical Castration on Sexual Recidivism Risk Among Sexually Violent Predatory Offenders, 33 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry L. 16, 24 (2005).

[42] Weinberger, supra note 41, at 28.

[43] Id.

[44] Id.

[45] Id.

[46] Id; see Horchak, supra note 3.

[47] La. Rev. Stat. § 14:43.7 (2024).

[48] Id.

[49] Id.

[50] Beckles v. United States, 580 U.S. 256, 266 (2017).

[51] Id.

[52] Id.

[53] La. Rev. Stat. § 14:43.7.

[54] U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

[55] Id.

[56] See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment affords no greater protections for inmates as to cruel and unusual punishments than the Eighth Amendment).

[57] U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

[58] Craft v. State, 308 So. 2d 290, 295 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 319 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975); see also State v. Miller, 269 So. 2d 829, 962 (La. 1972).

[59] Craft, 308 So. 2d at 295.

[60] See Kenneth B. Fromson, Comment, Beyond an Eye for an Eye: Castration As an Alternative Sentencing Measure, 11 N.Y.L.S. J. Hum. Rts. 311, 311 n.1 (1994).

[61] See Skinner v. State of Okl. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).

[62] See Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918).

[63] See Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914).

[64] See State v. Barton, 319 So. 3d 907 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 325 So. 3d 1071 (La. 2021), reconsideration denied, 325 So. 3d 1072 (La. 2021).

[65] Sarah Williams, Death Penalty Laws by State, FindLaw, https://www.findlaw.com/criminal/criminal-procedure/death-penalty-laws-by-state.html [https://perma.cc/AP8J-D397] (last updated Dec. 12, 2024).

[66] Id.

[67] Id.

[68] See Walter Berns, Defending the Death Penalty, 26 Crime & Delinquency 503 (October 1980).

[69] La. Rev. Stat. § 14:43.7.

[70] Weinberger, supra note 41, at 28.

Bigamy’s Blurred Boundaries: Addressing the Effect of Community Property Inheritance Laws on Bigamous Marriages

By Sarah Szwak

Introduction

Imagine a situation where Adam marries Betty. Years later, Adam leaves Betty and forms a relationship with Claudia, who never knew about Betty and Adam’s marriage. Adam eventually marries Claudia, without ever legally divorcing Betty.[1] During his marriage to Claudia, Adam dies and is not survived by any children. This unusual situation raises questions over who inherits Adam’s community property. Would Betty inherit the community property as Adam’s legal spouse, or would Claudia inherit the community property as Adam’s putative spouse?[2] The answers to these community property allocation questions depend on whether Adam acted in good or bad faith in marrying Claudia.[3] If Adam knew his marriage to Betty was not dissolved prior to his marriage to Claudia, he acted in bad faith in marrying Claudia, meaning that Betty and Claudia would likely each inherit one-half of the community property.[4] However, if Adam thought his marriage to Betty was dissolved, he acted in good faith in marrying Claudia, meaning that Claudia would likely inherit all of the community property.[5]

There are several issues with this current rule. First, dependance on the good or bad faith of a bigamous spouse is illogical in the context of the inheritance of community property because one cannot punish a bigamous spouse for his or her bad faith after death.[6] Disallowing the bigamist’s descendants to inherit community property punishes the descendants, which is unreasonable because the successors are not responsible for the deceased’s bad faith.[7] Second, inquiring into the bigamist’s good or bad faith requires extensive time and resources from the courts and parties. The parties must present evidence showing the deceased’s subjective intent, which is often a lengthy and difficult task.[8] The court must then take the time to consider this evidence and conclude whether the bigamist was in good or bad faith. Third, the circumstance explained in the above hypothetical has only been discussed among courts and has never been addressed by the legislature. Without legislative guidance, many unanswered questions remain and there is—and will continue to be—confusion across Louisiana courts about how to apportion community property in this circumstance.[9]

Because of the issues surrounding the current jurisprudential approach, the legislature should adopt a new law that allows the bigamist’s descendants to inherit one-half of the community property regardless of the bigamist’s good or bad faith. Additionally, the other half of the community property should go to the putative spouse regardless of the bigamist’s good or bad faith. This rule would end arbitrarily punishing the successors of a bad faith bigamist and greatly simplify the approach for courts and parties. Further, this proposal would eliminate the unanswered question of whether a bad faith legal spouse inherits community property because the legal spouse would never inherit community property regardless of the bigamist’s good or bad faith.

I. Louisiana’s Putative Marriage Doctrine

A valid marriage in Louisiana requires a marriage ceremony, the free consent of the parties, and the absence of a legal impediment.[10] There are three legal impediments to a marriage’s validity: a close relationship by blood or adoption, age, and a prior undissolved marriage.[11] The impediment of a prior undissolved marriage applies when two spouses marry, are never legally divorced, and then one of the spouses marries a second person.[12] The existence of a prior undissolved marriage means that the second marriage is an absolute nullity.[13]

Even though the second marriage is an absolute nullity, it can produce civil effects through the putative marriage doctrine.[14] Under the putative marriage doctrine, an absolutely null marriage produces civil effects in favor of a party as long as that party remains in good faith.[15] In the context of a putative marriage, good faith is an honest and reasonable belief that the marriage is valid and that no legal impediment exists.[16] Thus, good faith spouses to the second marriage must have a subjective belief that the marriage is valid, and that belief must be objectively reasonable.[17] In other words, a good faith spouse must honestly and reasonably believe that there was no impediment to the marriage. If these qualifications are met, then the putative marriage produces civil effects in favor of that spouse for as long as he or she remains in good faith.[18] However, when the impediment causing the nullity is a pre-existing marriage, the civil effects continue for the non-bigamist spouse until the marriage is declared null or the parties contract a valid marriage, even if the non-bigamist spouse is no longer in good faith.[19]

II. Community Property Inheritance and Putative Spouses

Louisiana law provides for a community property regime and states that property acquired during a marriage belongs to both spouses in a present, undivided one-half interest.[20] A judgment of divorce retroactively terminates the community property regime to the date of filing of the petition for divorce.[21] However, when no judgment of divorce is rendered and the couple remains married until one spouse dies, the inheritance of the community property depends on whether any descendants survive the deceased.[22] If the deceased spouse leaves descendants, those descendants and the surviving spouse will each inherit one‑half of the community property.[23] If no descendants exist, the surviving spouse inherits all community property.[24]

As explained in the introductory hypothetical, it is possible to have both a legal spouse and putative spouse.[25] Thus, the question as to who inherits the community property in this circumstance is important. The courts have struggled with how to approach this question, but the answer currently depends on whether the bigamist acted in good or bad faith to procure the second marriage.[26]

III. Jurisprudence on Community Property Inheritance When a Bigamous Spouse Is in Bad Faith

Louisiana jurisprudence is unclear on how to divide community property upon the death of a bigamist in bad faith.[27] In Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the putative spouse and legal spouse each inherit one-half of the community property when the bigamist is in bad faith.[28] In Patton, Abraham Morehouse married Abigail Young and fathered two children in New York.[29] Later, Abraham moved to Louisiana and claimed to be a widower without ever divorcing Abigail.[30] Abraham then married Bléonore Hook and fathered more children.[31] Upon Abraham’s death, the Court held that both Abigail, the legal spouse, and Bléonore, the putative spouse, would each inherit one‑half of the community property.[32] The Court reasoned that Abigail should inherit because Abraham had abandoned her and Abigail should not lose her rights “on accounting of the fault and misconduct of her husband.”[33]

A hundred years later, the Louisiana Supreme Court held, in Succession of Chavis, that although the bigamist was in bad faith, the legal spouse would not inherit.[34] Rather, the community property was split in half between the putative spouse and the descendants.[35] In Chavis, Alvin Chavis filed for separation of bed and board from his wife, Gladys Chavis, but married Onelia Chavis before a judgment of divorce was granted.[36] The Court found that Alvin was in bad faith, but stated that his bad faith was “immaterial” to the Court’s opinion.[37] Thus, the Court held that Onelia, the putative spouse, and Alvin’s descendants would each inherit one-half of the community property.[38]

In Succession of Choyce, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal relied on Patton and held that both the legal spouse and putative spouse were entitled to one-half of the community property when the bigamist acted in bad faith.[39] In Choyce, Frank Choyce married Pauline Choyce Conaway and fathered a child.[40] Years later, Frank moved to Louisiana, claimed he had never been married before, married another woman, Annie V. Craig Choyce, and fathered four more children.[41] Upon Frank’s death, the court found that he was in bad faith and followed the precedent in Patton.[42] The court held that both Annie, the putative wife, and Pauline, the legal wife, would inherit one-half of the community property and the descendants would not inherit any community property.[43] As shown in Patton, Chavis, and Choyce, the jurisprudence on the community property rights of the putative spouse, legal spouse, and descendants when the bigamist is in bad faith is unclear.[44] However, Louisiana courts most frequently apply the Patton rule, which states that the putative spouse and legal spouse each inherit one-half of the community property.[45]

IV. Jurisprudence on Community Property Inheritance When a Bigamous Spouse Is in Good Faith

In Prince v. Hopson, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the putative spouse and legal spouse would each inherit one-fourth of the community property and the other half would go to the bigamist’s descendants when the bigamous spouse was in good faith.[46] In Prince, James Brough filed for divorce from his wife, Victoria H. Albert.[47] A preliminary default was entered but no final judgment of divorce was rendered.[48]James then married another woman, Clementine Prince.[49]  No evidence existed showing that James knew he was still married to Victoria before his marriage to Clementine.[50] The Court found that both James and Clementine, the putative wife, were in good faith.[51] Thus, the Court held that the community property would be apportioned between Clementine, the putative wife, and Victoria, the legal wife, in fourths, and the descendants would inherit one-half of the community property.[52] The Court’s reasoning in allowing the descendants to inherit was that the deceased’s good faith resulted in him obtaining the civil effects of the putative marriage, which meant he owned one-half of the community property.[53]

In 2022, the Louisiana Supreme Court held, in Succession of Burns, that when both spouses to a putative marriage are in good faith, the putative spouse inherits one-half of the community property, the bigamist’s descendants inherit the other half of the community property, and the legal spouse does not inherit.[54] In Burns, the original divorce proceeding was filed in Arkansas.[55] An Arkansas district court rendered a judgment of divorce, but the wife’s name was misspelled as “Sybia” rather than Silver.[56] Also, Silver’s alleged signatures on two documents from the proceedings were signed “Sybia.”[57] The husband, Willie Clyde Burns, filed a second petition for divorce in Louisiana, but a final judgment of divorce was never rendered in that case.[58] Both spouses believed they were legally divorced from each other, and Willie remarried Annie Lee Bradley.[59] Upon Willie’s death, the Court found that both spouses to the putative marriage were in good faith.[60] The Court held that Annie, the putative spouse, and the descendants would each inherit one-half of the community property, and Silver, the legal spouse, would not inherit.[61] The Court reasoned that the husband’s good faith allowed him to obtain the civil effects of the putative marriage.[62] Thus, his descendants were entitled to his one-half share of the community property.[63]

V. Fixing the Flaws in Community Property Inheritance Involving Bigamous Marriages

A. Current Law

The inheritance of the legal spouse, putative spouse, and the bigamist’s descendants currently depend on whether the bigamist was in good or bad faith when entering the second marriage.[64] The justification for this rule is that a putative marriage produces civil effects in favor of a party in good faith as long as that party remains in good faith.[65] Thus, if the bigamist is in bad faith, he cannot obtain the civil effects of the putative marriage, which includes the ownership of one-half of the community property.[66]

Although this rule can be logically applied in other scenarios involving putative marriages, this rule should not be applied when determining community property inheritance rights upon the death of a bigamist for several reasons.[67] First, a bigamous spouse in bad faith does not receive the civil effects as punishment for being in bad faith.[68] Once the bigamous spouse in bad faith is deceased, the punishment is instead directed to the descendants.[69] This result is absurd. The descendants should not be punished for their ascendant’s bad faith because they have no control over their ascendant’s actions.[70] Thus, the bigamist’s descendants should inherit one-half of the community property regardless of their successor’s bad faith. Second, an inquiry into the bigamist’s good or bad faith requires the parties to produce evidence surrounding the bigamist’s subjective intent.[71] In a divorce action where this issue is raised, the burden is insignificant because the bigamist may testify as to subjective intent. However, when succession cases raise issues over the decedent’s intent, the bigamist is deceased, leaving the parties with the task of proving the decedent’s subjective intent.[72]

The current jurisprudential rules are problematic for several reasons. First, these types of cases require exorbitant time and resources from the parties and the courts. Thus, legislation would provide clarity for how to properly manage these disputes. Second, the lack of legislative guidance on this issue has caused—and continues to cause—inconsistencies among Louisiana courts.[73] Without legislative support, courts must jurisprudentially develop the law in this area, which is problematic given the highly complex and fact-intensive nature of this litigation.[74] For example, the Patton Court held that when there is a good faith legal spouse and a bad faith bigamist, the legal spouse will inherit one-half of the community property.[75] However, the community property apportionment when both the bigamist and legal spouse are in bad faith is unknown.

B. Proposal

Because of the issues surrounding the current jurisprudential approach, the legislature should adopt a rule that states, “In the circumstance of a deceased being survived by a legal spouse and putative spouse, the putative spouse shall inherit the whole of the community property. If the deceased leaves descendants, then the descendants and the putative spouse shall inherit one-half of the community property each.” This proposed rule allows the descendants to inherit one-half of the community property regardless of the bigamist’s good or bad faith. Under this rule, the legal spouse would not inherit even if the deceased was in bad faith. Allowing the legal spouse to inherit a portion of the community property from the putative marriage gives the legal spouse a windfall. The legal spouse typically never contributes to the putative community property regime, so the legal spouse should not gain any portion of that property upon the death of the bigamist.[76]

Adoption of this rule would terminate the arbitrary punishment of the bigamist’s descendants.[77] Additionally, this rule would simplify the approach for courts and parties, saving time and resources. Lastly, the legislature’s adoption of this rule would give the courts clarity and resolve the inconsistencies in the jurisprudence.[78]

Conclusion

Determining the community property apportionment after the death of a bigamist is important to both the legal and putative spouse, as well as the bigamist’s descendants. Several issues surrounding the current jurisprudential approach call for legislative action.[79] The legislature should adopt a rule that allows the bigamist’s descendants and the putative spouse to each inherit one-half of the community property regardless of the bigamist’s good or bad faith. Adoption of this rule would provide a clear and simple approach. Additionally, it would solve the problems of unfairly punishing the bigamist’s descendants and allowing the legal spouse to inherit from the putative community property regime that they likely never contributed to.[80] Thus, the legislature should step in to provide clarity for litigants who will face this complex dilemma in the future.

[1] One cannot be married to two people at once. La. Civ. Code art. 88 (2025). However, the marriage between Adam and Claudia may produce civil effects in favor of one or both spouses under the putative marriage doctrine depending on whether one or both of the parties to the marriage was in good faith when entering the marriage. See id. art. 96.

[2] A putative marriage is a marriage that is null but produces civil effects because at least one of the parties entered the marriage in good faith. Id. art. 96. In this situation, one can assume that Claudia was unaware of Adam’s prior marriage to Betty. Thus, Claudia would be in good faith and obtain the civil effects of the putative marriage. See id. One civil effect which Betty is entitled to under the Louisiana Civil Code is inheritance of at least a portion of community property. Id. art. 2336.

[3] The community property allocation is dependent on Adam’s good or bad faith because only good faith spouses obtain the civil effects of a putative marriage. Id. art. 96. Thus, for any portion of the community property to belong to Adam, he must be in good faith. Id. arts. 88, 96.

[4] The above hypothetical is loosely based on Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans. 1 La. Ann. 98 (1846). In Patton, the community property was divided between the putative and legal spouse when the deceased was a bad faith bigamist. Id. at 106. It is noteworthy that under this rule, if Adam had descendants, those descendants would not inherit any portion of the community property. Typically, descendants inherit one-half of the community property. La. Civ. Code arts. 888–89.

[5] Succession of Burns, 354 So. 3d 1197, 1201 (La. 2022). In Succession of Burns, the inheritance was divided between the descendants and the putative spouse when the bigamist was in good faith. Id. at 1203–04. The outcome of the hypothetical would be different if Adam had descendants. In this case, the community property would be split in half between Claudia and the descendants. La. Civ. Code art. 889.

[6] Monica Hof Wallace, The Pitfalls of a Putative Marriage and the Call for a Putative Divorce, 64 La. L. Rev. 71, 114–16 (2003).

[7] Id.

[8] Good faith is typically presumed. Eddy v. Eddy, 271 So. 2d 333, 335 (La. Ct. App. 1972). However, good faith is not presumed for the bigamist because they caused the nullity of the marriage. Gathright v. Smith, 368 So. 2d 679, 683 (La. 1978). Thus, in this circumstance, the parties must present evidence showing the good or bad faith of the bigamist.

[9] Compare Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106 (holding that the putative and legal spouse each inherit one-half of the decedent’s community property when the deceased was in bad faith), and Succession of Chavis, 29 So. 2d 860, 864 (La. 1947) (holding that the putative spouse and children would each inherit one-half of the decedent’s community property when the deceased was in bad faith), with Prince v. Hopson, 89 So. 2d 128, 133 (La. 1956) (holding that the children would inherit one-half of the community property and the putative and legal spouse would inherit one-fourth each when the deceased was in good faith), and Burns, 354 So.3d at 1201 (holding that the putative spouse and children would each inherit one-half of the decedent’s community property when the deceased was in good faith). Wallace, supra note 6, at 95. Although courts have addressed cases concerning both good and bad faith bigamists, a case involving this issue where the legal spouse is in bad faith has never been addressed. Thus, it is questionable whether the rule under Patton would apply, and the bad faith legal spouse would inherit one-half of the community property, or a completely different rule would apply. See 1 La. Ann. at 106.

[10] La. Civ. Code art. 87 (2025). Although this blog post focuses on the requirement of the absence of a legal impediment, a marriage ceremony and free consent of the parties is also required for a valid marriage. Id. At the marriage ceremony, both parties must be present, and the ceremony must be conducted by a third-party officiant who is qualified or the parties reasonably believe is qualified. Monica Hof Wallace, A Primer on Marriage in Louisiana, 64 Loy. L. Rev. 557, 579 (2018). The absence of a marriage ceremony makes the marriage absolutely null. La. Civ. Code art. 94. The free consent of the parties requires that neither party be subjected to duress and both are capable of discernment. Id. art. 93. Duress is when consent of a spouse is vitiated through a threat of injury against the spouse or an ascendant or descendent of the spouse. Id. art. 1960. However, duress does not include a threat of doing a lawful act or exercising a valid right. Id. art. 1962. The presence of duress in contracting a marriage creates a relative nullity. Id. art. 95.

[11] Id. arts. 88, 90, 90.1. Though not the focus of this blog post, the legal impediment of relationship by blood or adoptions means that ascendants, descendants, and collaterals within the fourth degree cannot marry each other. Id. art. 90. This applies whether the relationship is by blood or adoption, with the exception that collaterals within the fourth degree by adoption may marry with judicial authorization. Id. The legal impediment of age means that a person under 16 may not marry, and minors between 16 and 17 years old may not marry a major that is three or more years older than them. Id. art. 90.1. Same‑sex marriage is still written into the Code as a legal impediment to marriage, but the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges held that same‑sex marriage is constitutionally protected. Id. art. 89; Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644, 675–76 (2015).

[12] La. Civ. Code art. 88.

[13] Id. art. 94. An absolutely null marriage cannot be confirmed, and the nullity may be brought by anyone. Id. This is contrasted from a relatively null marriage, which can be cured through confirmation of the marriage. Id. art. 95.

[14] Id. art. 96.

[15] Id. A putative marriage produces the same civil effects as a legally valid marriage, such as alimony, the marital portion, and inheritance of community property. Cortes v. Fleming, 307 So. 2d 611, 615–16 (La. 1973); Wallace, supra note 6, at 72.

[16] La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 96 cmt. d.

[17] Wallace, supra note 10, at 588–89.

[18] La. Civ. Code art. 96.

[19] Id.

[20] There are several exceptions to this rule, as Louisiana’s community property regime is a complex legal regime. However, the general rule is that property acquired during the marriage is community property. Id. arts. 2336, 2338.

[21] Id. art. 159.

[22] Id. arts. 888, 889.

[23] Id. art. 889.

[24] Id.

[25] See discussion infra Part I.

[26] Compare Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98, 106 (1846), with Succession of Burns, 354 So. 3d 1197, 1201 (La., 2022).

[27] Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106; Succession of Chavis, 29 So. 2d 860, 864 (La. 1947); Succession of Choyce, 183 So. 2d 457, 459 (La. Ct. App. 1966).

[28] Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106.

[29] Id. at 101.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Id. at 106.

[33] Id.

[34] Succession of Chavis, 29 So. 2d 860, 864 (La. 1947).

[35] Id.

[36] Id. at 862. A separation of bed and board is a legal separation of the married couple without an actual divorce. Couples can no longer file for legal separation in Louisiana as, in 1990, the legislature repealed the Civil Code articles authorizing this. Susan Kalinka, Acts 1990, No. 1009: The Repeal of Provisions for Separation from Bed and Board Increases the Federal Income Tax Burden of Separated Spouses in Louisiana, 53 La. L. Rev. 597, 597–98 (1993). Now, legal separation is only applicable to covenant marriages. La. Rev. Stat. § 9:309 (2024).

[37] Chavis, 29 So. 2d at 864.

[38] Id.

[39] Succession of Choyce, 183 So. 2d 457, 459 (La. Ct. App. 1966).

[40] Id. at 458.

[41] Id.

[42] Id.

[43] Id. at 459.

[44] Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98, 106 (1846); Succession of Chavis, 29 So. 2d 860, 864 (La. 1947); Choyce, 183 So. 2d at 459.

[45] Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106.

[46] Prince v. Hopson, 89 So. 2d 128, 133 (La. 1956).

[47] Id. at 129.

[48] Id. at 129–30. The concept of preliminary defaults was repealed by the legislature in 2022. Victoria Cvitanovic, Updates to the Louisiana Default Judgment Rules, Wilson Elser (Aug. 29, 2023), https://www.wilsonelser.com/publications/updates-to-the-louisiana-default-judgment-rules [https://perma.cc/AKW8-X2KV]. However, before the law was repealed, plaintiffs were required to obtain a preliminary default prior to a default judgment. Preliminary defaults were essentially a warning period for the defendant and did not have the same legal effect as a default judgment. See generally Glessner v. Hyatt, 380 So. 2d 222 (La. Ct. App. 1980).

[49] Prince, 89 So. 2d at 130.

[50] Id.

[51] Id. at 132.

[52] Id. at 133.

[53] Id. at 132.

[54] Succession of Burns, 354 So. 3d 1197, 1201 (La. 2022).

[55] Id. at 1199.

[56] Id.

[57] Id.

[58] Id.

[59] Id.

[60] Id.

[61] Id. at 1201.

[62] Id.

[63] Id.

[64] Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98, 106 (1846); Burns, 354 So. 3d at 1201.

[65] La. Civ. Code art. 96 (2025).

[66] Id. art. 2336.

[67] The rule of disallowing a bad faith bigamist to receive the civil effects of a putative marriage is logical in situations where the bigamist is alive because the bigamist does not receive civil effects as a punishment for his bad faith.

[68] Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106; Wallace, supra note 6, at 114.

[69] Wallace, supra note 6, at 114–17.

[70] Id. The recognition that descendants should not be punished for their ascendant’s actions is recognized in other areas of succession law, such as unworthiness. An heir can be declared unworthy for being criminally convicted of a crime involving the killing or attempted killing of the decedent or is judicially determined in a civil proceeding to have participated in the intentional, unjustified killing or attempted killing of the decedent. La. Civ. Code art. 941. However, even when that heir is declared unworthy, we allow their descendants to inherit by representation. Id. art. 942. This rule is logical because the descendants should not be punished for their ascendant’s conduct.

[71] See discussion infra Part II (good faith involves a subjective element); Wallace, supra note 10, at 588–89.

[72] Good faith is presumed except for the party that caused the nullity of the marriage. Eddy v. Eddy, 271 So. 2d 333, 335 (La. Ct. App. 1972); Gathright v. Smith, 368 So. 2d 679, 683 (La. 1978). Therefore, the descendants would have to prove their ascendant’s good faith to inherit.

[73] Compare Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106, with Succession of Chavis, 29 So. 2d 860, 864 (La. 1947). In both cases, the Court was presented with a bad faith bigamous spouse. However, the apportionment of the community property at issue was different.

[74] Courts are limited to deciding specific cases, whereas the legislature can announce broad rules. See La. Const. arts. II, III, V. Without legislative action, the only questions that the courts have been able to answer are the questions that specific cases require an answer to. Id. arts. II, V.

[75] Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106.

[76] Wallace, supra note 6, at 90–91, 110–11.

[77] Id. at 114–17.

[78] Compare Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106, with Chavis, 29 So. 2d at 864. Both courts faced the same issue but came different to conclusions.

[79] See discussion infra Part VI.

[80] Wallace, supra note 6, at 90–91, 110–11, 114–17.