Whose Product Is It Anyway? Examining Amazon’s Liability Under the LPLA for Products Sold by Third Parties on its Website

by Braxton Duhon

I. Introduction: An Explosive Case

Angela Bolger, like many Amazon Prime[1] customers, often used Amazon to order items that she needed.[2] On one such occasion, Bolger searched the internet for a replacement laptop battery and ultimately ordered one from Amazon.[3] Amazon then shipped Bolger a Lenoge[4] laptop battery, which she received a few days later.[5] After opening the Amazon-branded box, wrapped in Amazon-branded shipping tape, Bolger installed and began to use her new laptop battery.[6] The laptop battery exploded within the first few months of use, placing Bolger in the hospital for two weeks because of serious burns.[7] Bolger then filed suit against Amazon seeking compensation for her injuries under the theory of strict products liability.[8]

The Bolger case is not as straightforward as it initially appears because Lenoge––the original manufacturer––is a third-party seller that utilizes Amazon to sell its product and fulfill such sales.[9] Ultimately, the California Court of Appeal held that Amazon was potentially liable under strict products liability for the sale of a defective third-party laptop battery on its site when the original manufacturer was part of the “Fulfillment by Amazon” (FBA) program and Amazon played an integral role in the overall production and marketing process.[10] Because of Amazon’s unique distribution structure under the FBA program, other courts have struggled to apply traditional strict products liability laws.[11] Continue reading

To Play or Not to Play: College Football and COVID-19

by M. Max Sternberg

1. Introduction

On August 11, 2020, and after months of speculation, the Big Ten Conference canceled all fall sports, including football, due to safety concerns in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.[1] Later that same day, the Pac-12 Conference followed suit and also canceled all fall sports.[2] However, on September 16, the Big Ten reversed course and announced that it will in fact have a football season starting October 24, 2020.[3] Furthermore, on September 24, the Pac-12 decided to play a seven game conference only football season starting November 6.[4] As a result, only three (3) schools in the Division 1 Football Bowl Subdivision have canceled the season outright.[5] Canceling the college football season presents new and unique legal questions for those conferences and schools that do not play football, and for the NCAA as well.[6] Alternatively, the conferences and schools that do play football will face their own set of challenges. What’s more, the situation surrounding the decision to play or not to play is constantly changing. Since the first draft of this post, the Big Ten and the Pac-12 have both reinstated football.[7] In light of this evolving situation, and in hopes of providing some clarity, this blog post will address some of the new legal issues raised by either playing or not playing college sports this fall, particularly college football. Continue reading

Volume 81 Junior Associates Announced!

The Louisiana Law Review Volume 81 Board of Editors and Senior Associates would like to extend our congratulations to the newly selected Volume 81 Junior Associates. It is a great honor to be selected as a Junior Associate, and we are very excited to introduce them to you!

The Louisiana Law Review Editorial Board and Senior Associates welcome the following:

Camille Arceneaux

Kennedy Beal

Heidi Bieber

Madeleine Breaux

Caroline Campagna

Andrew Chenevert

Gabrielle Domangue

Alex Domingue

Natalie Earles

Sydney Galinski

Sara Grasch

Olivia Guidry

Emma Looney

Patrick McDonald

Victoria Montanio

Chaz Morgan

Brennan O’Keefe

Bradley Oster

Austin Pottorff

Marina Speligene

Harper Street

Casey Thibodeaux

Christopher Vidrine

Justin Ware

Andrew Young

Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSA DVA Healthcare: Attorneys’ Fees and Courtroom Strategy

by Hunter Hewell, Senior Associate 

I. Introduction

Much like in the federal court system, Texas courts require each party in a suit to pay for their own attorney’s fees.[1] Some circumstances, however, allow for fee-shifting, in which the prevailing party may recover its attorney’s fees from the opposing party.[2] This fee-shifting arrangement is subject to certain requirements: (1) it must be authorized by statute or contract and (2) the party seeking its attorney’s fees must prove the reasonableness of the fee.[3] Although these requirements seem straightforward, courts throughout Texas have struggled with what methodology must be used and what facts the party seeking its attorney’s fees must present to determine the reasonableness of attorney’s fees once a fee-shifting authorization statute is invoked.[4] In 2019, the Texas Supreme Court passed down the Rohrmoos ruling, which specifically addressed what methodology courts and attorneys must use to determine how attorneys’ fees should be apportioned under these circumstances.[5]

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Timbs v. Indiana—One Year Later: Benign or Beginning of the End for Civil Asset Forfeiture

by Monica Bergeron, Senior Associate

I. An Introduction to Civil Asset Forfeiture

Tonya Smith and her husband were casino-hopping in West Virginia when the police pulled them over for illegal use of a lane.[1] The officers searched the car for drugs, but finding none, seized $10,478 in cash and gift cards that the couple had with them—without charging either of them with a crime.[2] In another forfeiture case, Isiah Kinloch had just called 911 after a man broke into his home and assaulted him.[3] When the police arrived, they searched his apartment and found one ounce of marijuana and $1,800 in cash.[4] They kept the cash.[5] In both of these cases, law enforcement was able to seize private property under the guise of civil asset forfeiture, the infamous practice “so contrary to a basic sense of justice and fairness”[6] that it is often referred to as “legalized theft.”[7]

Civil asset forfeiture allows a state to seize, sell, and retain part of the proceeds of private property simply based on the assumption that the property was either connected to, or the product of, criminal activity.[8] Unlike criminal asset forfeiture proceedings that occur against an individual after a conviction, civil asset forfeiture proceedings are against the property itself, in rem, regardless of whether the State ever convicted the owner of the alleged criminal activity.[9] Civil asset forfeiture therefore operates on the legal fiction that “the property itself is guilty.”[10] Experts and commentators criticize civil asset forfeiture on many grounds, but primarily because of the high potential for, and evidence of, abuse.[11] In most of the 47 states[12] with civil asset forfeiture, the profits from the forfeited property go directly into the pockets of law enforcement agencies such as the police, the prosecutors, and the criminal court systems.[13] Proponents of the practice argue that it targets career criminals, depriving them of their illegally acquired profits.[14] Studies, however, show that the practice does little to take the bite out of serious crime and disproportionately targets minorities and the poor.[15]

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