An Inherent Contradiction: Corporate Discretion in Morals Clause Enforcement

This Article chronicles the development and creation of the morals clause as a means to curb various types of expression. It provides a comprehensive background and historical context of the development of the implied obligation of good faith. Additionally, it explains how public policy considerations influence the enforceability of some contracts. Moreover, it analyzes the Rashard Mendenhall case that brought the issue of discretionary enforcement of morals clauses to light. It highlights the perils of providing corporations with the power to exercise their own discretion in unilaterally determining whether an athlete-endorser’s conduct is morally reprehensible. It provides a resolution to this problem and explains how the solution presented in this Article strikes a fairer balance between the interests of society, the endorser, and the corporation. Finally, it discusses the various types of speech that are protected by the First Amendment and how, by analogy, First Amendment jurisprudence can be used to determine what types of speech should be protected contractually.

Memorandum from Student-Athletes to Schools: My Social Media Posts Regarding My Coaches or My Causes Are Protected Speech—How the NLRB Is Restructuring Rights of StudentAthletes in Private Institutions

Roger M. Groves

This Article provides an overview of applicable NLRB authorities relevant to how private schools at the highest level, D-1, can regulate the speech and activities of their athletes. It also examines a line of cases that take a tortured route to a pronouncement from the NLRB Office of the General Counsel. Additionally, it analyzes the General Counsel Memorandum (“GCM”) and its application to student-athletes. It elaborates on fascinating legal distinctions and nuances articulated by the Board and General Counsel. The Article explores how an Advice Memorandum from an NLRB Regional Director can invalidate entire sections of a university’s policies regarding student-athletes. It sets out various hypotheticals that expand on existing circumstances to illustrate when social protests and activism are a protected activity under the Act. The Article provides a best practices model for affected universities to respond to the newly established relationship between institutions and student-athletes. The Article concludes with the futuristic application of employee status to categories of students beyond athletes and the repercussions rippling through academia’s private institutions.

William W. Berry III

Marc Edelman

Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto

This Comment examines the history of the clergy-penitent privilege from its biblical origins to its modern treatment in American courts. It surveys the status of mandatory reporting law in Louisiana and the rest of the United States, focusing on statutory exceptions for clergy. It explores the constitutional basis for abrogating the clergy-penitent privilege within mandatory reporting law. Finally, it considers a jurisprudential example of the negative effects of the privilege on the reporting of child abuse and contemplates potential avenues for encouraging Catholic priests to report abuse while still maintaining the integrity of the sacrament of Confession.

This Comment discusses the MMA’s enactment, including the public policy concerns behind the Act, and details the advantages and disadvantages it entails for both health care providers and tort victims. It introduces Coleman, the source of the six-factor test, and argues that these factors are an insufficient test for determining malpractice claims in Louisiana. It discusses two Louisiana Supreme Court cases, including the recent decision of Dupuy v. NMC Operating Company, as examples of the unpredictability of the Coleman factors and of a court’s tendency to apply these factors broadly, contrary to Louisiana’s public policy on interpreting the MMA. Finally, it recommends legislative action to remedy the test for determining whether a certain claim constitutes malpractice and proposes an alteration of the Coleman factors as an interim solution for Louisiana courts.

This Comment provides background on the United States Supreme Court’s recent expansion of individual rights and liberties and the significant ambiguities surrounding the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally it analyzes Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute and the issues surrounding the bigamous marriage debate generally. Furthermore, this Comment conducts a constitutional analysis of Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute and highlights the central issues the statute raises. Lastly, it proposes that the Louisiana Supreme Court, if confronted with the constitutionality of Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute, should decline to extend the fundamental right to marry to bigamous unions under a rational basis review. Instead, the Louisiana Supreme Court should hold the portion of the statute criminalizing bigamous marriage unconstitutional in light of Lawrence v. Texas and the greater privacy rights that Louisiana citizens enjoy under the state constitution.