by Elise I. Diebold
Introduction
Just two weeks after a car accident claimed the life of their daughter, Ivie Efferson’s parents filed a petition to annul their deceased daughter’s marriage under Louisiana Civil Code article 2030.[1] Article 2030 provides a general rule of conventional obligations which states that “[a] contract is absolutely null when it violates a rule of public order, as when the object of a contract is illicit or immoral.”[2] However, in Wederstrandt v. Kol, the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that article 2030 does not apply to the contract of marriage.[3] Instead, marriage contracts are classified as absolute nullities only under the exclusive grounds enumerated in Louisiana Civil Code article 94.[4] Thus, article 2030 may not be used as a basis for annulling marriages.[5] However, this decision raises the implication that marriages may in fact be entered into for the purpose of violating a rule of public order, provided that all other requirements to perfect a valid marriage contract are met.[6]
Background
In June 2021, an automobile accident took the life of Ivie Efferson.[7] At the time of her death, Ivie was married to Eden Kol.[8] Soon after Ivie’s death, Ivie’s parents, Billy Efferson, Jr. and Amy Wederstrandt, filed a petition to annul Ivie’s marriage to Eden.[9] Ivie’s parents alleged that the marriage between Ivie and Eden “was fraudulent and entered into for the purpose of violating federal immigration law as found in 8 U.S.C. § 1325(C).”[10] Under Louisiana Civil Code article 2030, contracts that “violate a rule of public order, as when the object of a contract is illicit or immoral” are absolute nullities.[11] Thus, Ivie’s parents argued that the marriage contract between Ivie and Eden was absolutely null and violated Louisiana Civil Code article 2030 because it “violate[d] a rule of public order and is ‘clearly illicit and immoral.’”[12] In support of this argument, Ivie’s parents further alleged: (1) Ivie and Eden had no “meaningful” relationship; (2) they did not “cohabitate as husband and wife”; (3) they maintained romantic relationships with others during the course of their marriage; and (4) Eden paid Ivie “$10,000 in cash” as compensation for entering into a fraudulent marriage.[13]
The defendant, Eden, answered the petition and filed an exception of no cause of action, arguing that Ivie’s parents had failed to state a cause of action to annul Ivie and Eden’s marriage.[14] Eden asserted that the sole requirements to enter into a valid marriage are found in Louisiana Civil Code article 87 and the “exclusive bases” to annul a marriage are found in Louisiana Civil Code article 94.[15] Further, Eden argued that other provisions of the Civil Code, particularly article 2030, are not incorporated into the laws of marriage.[16] Since Ivie’s parents alleged no violation of article 94, Eden argued that Ivie’s parents failed to state a cause of action under which Ivie and Eden’s marriage could be annulled.[17]
After hearing Eden’s exception of no cause of action, the trial court sustained the exception and dismissed the petition with prejudice.[18] On appeal, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that article 94 is a “more specific statute as it relates to nullity of a marriage.”[19] Thus, the First Circuit determined that “general principles of conventional obligations” do not apply broadly to the contract of marriage because of the specificity of article 94.[20] The First Circuit further determined that Ivie’s parents could not amend their petition to state a cause of action for nullity under article 94.[21] Unsatisfied with the First Circuit’s judgment, Ivie’s parents filed a writ application to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which the Court granted.[22] Following an analysis of various provisions within the Louisiana Civil Code, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit’s ruling, holding that Ivie’s parents failed to plead a cause of action to annul Ivie’s marriage.[23]
At issue, the Louisiana Supreme Court had to determine whether the grounds to annul a marriage under article 94 are exclusive.[24] Recognizing that the resolution of this issue would involve interpretation of various Louisiana Civil Code articles, the Court iterated that the starting point of any legislative interpretation begins with the text of the statute itself.[25] Legislation should be applied as written, assuming that no absurd consequences flow from that application.[26]
Then, the Court noted that marriage is a “legal relationship ‘created by civil contract’ subject to ‘special rules prescribed by law.’”[27] The Court examined the requirements for the formation of a valid marriage contract[28] in conjunction with the three sources of absolute nullity of a marriage contract found in Louisiana Civil Code article 94.[29] The Court noted that article 94 lists these three sources for absolute nullity but does not contain a “catchall provision.”[30] The Court applied the statutory construction doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius[31] and determined that the legislature intentionally decided to list three sources of nullity and no others.[32] The Court further determined that its interpretation would not lead to absurd consequences, meaning that further interpretation would be inappropriate.[33]
After reaching this result, the Court determined that there was no need to expand the exclusive list in article 94 “through reference to conventional obligations.”[34] Contrary to the Court’s eventual findings, Ivie’s parents asserted that Louisiana Civil Code article 2030 should apply to marriage contracts, like it does for other conventional obligations.[35] Under article 2030, other conventional obligations are absolute nullities when they “violate[] a rule of public order.”[36] Ivie’s parents contended that Ivie and Eden’s marriage was an absolute nullity because Ivie and Eden entered into that marriage for the purpose of violating federal immigration law, which is a violation of a rule of public order.[37] However, the Court declined to incorporate the provisions of article 2030 into article 94.[38]
In support of its decision, the Court noted that article 94 is complete as written, requires no further interpretation, and further interpretation would run counter to the principles of statutory interpretation.[39] The Civil Code articles relating to marriage contracts are found in Book I, Title IV while the general principles of conventional obligations are found in Book III, Title IV.[40] Within Book III, Title IV are Louisiana Civil Code articles 1916 and 1914.[41] Article 1916 states that: “[a]ll contracts, nominate and innominate, are subject to the rules of this title.”[42] Louisiana Civil Code article 1914 lists the various “nominate” contracts but notably leaves out the contract of “marriage.”[43] Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that the legislature did not intend for article 1916 to incorporate the conventional obligations principles into the marriage contract because marriage is a “nominate” contract but not one specifically listed in article 1914.[44]
Further, the Court considered statements made during the prior to the revision of various code articles related to marriage.[45] At the committee meeting, the “Committee specifically declined to set forth a blanket approval (or disapproval) of reference to general obligations principles.”[46] Professor Katherine Spaht specifically noted that, in certain occasions, it is necessary to consult the rules of general obligations “to resolve questions unanswered by the special rules in Chapters 1 or 2 of Title IV of Book I of the Civil Code. Since marriage is created by a civil contract, it is appropriate in many instances to do so.”[47] Thus, in cases where there are gaps in the law, particularly with respect to the contract of marriage, the general principles of conventional obligations can and should be applied.[48] However, in the absence of gaps, the general principles of conventional obligations should not be applied.[49] Since the Wederstrandt court determined that article 94 is complete as written, it determined that there are no gaps which need to be filled by the principles of conventional obligations.[50]
In further support of its position, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered the potential policy implications of incorporating Louisiana Civil Code article 2030 into Louisiana Civil Code article 94.[51] The Court noted that if marriages entered into for “illicit and immoral purposes” were absolute nullities, the Court would be faced with the “distasteful task” of determining what constitutes an illicit or immoral purpose.[52] The Court found that such “judicial meddling” would have policy implications that would not be inconsequential.[53] Considering these policy implications and the principles of statutory interpretation, the Court determined that Ivie’s parents failed to state a cause of action to annul Ivie and Eden’s marriage under the exclusive grounds enumerated in article 94.[54] Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ decision to dismiss Ivie’s parents’ petition.[55]
A Conflict in Codal Interpretation
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Wederstrandt v. Kol did more than bar Ivie Wederstrandt’s parents from annulling her marriage to Eden Kol.[56] The Court’s holding also raised an implication that marriages may be legally entered into for a wide variety of reasons, some of which may be illegal.[57] In fact, the Court’s interpretation of Louisiana Civil Code article 94 seems to “authorize[] and even encourage[]” the idea that the contract of marriage may be entered into for the purpose of violating another law.[58]
To reach its interpretation of article 94, the majority relied on the basic rules of statutory interpretation that provide that a clearly written law should be applied as written so long as no absurd consequences result from that interpretation.[59] From there, the majority determined that Louisiana Civil Code article 94 is clear as written, and the grounds to annul a marriage in article 94 are exclusive.[60] The majority subsequently stated that no absurd consequences flow from this interpretation, meaning that any further interpretation would be unnecessary.[61]
However, as Chief Justice Weimer’s dissent suggests, the majority’s argument may be fundamentally flawed.[62] While the majority continuously stated that its interpretation of article 94 as written would not lead to absurd consequences, Weimer’s dissent asserts that this very case demonstrates the potential for absurd consequences.[63] According to Weimer, allowing a couple to “enter into a marriage contract for the sole purpose of engaging in criminal activity by evading federal immigration laws” leads to an absurd result.[64] Treating the marital relationship as a vehicle to violate other laws fails to afford the institution of marriage “a degree of respect” to which it is entitled.[65]
In their separate dissenting opinions, Justices Weimer and Crain suggest that the grounds to annul a marriage in Louisiana Civil Code article 94 are not exclusive and that Louisiana Civil Code article 7 should be considered as an additional ground under which a marriage can be annulled.[66] Louisiana Civil Code article 7 states, “Persons may not by their juridical acts derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the public interest. Any act in derogation of such laws is an absolute nullity.”[67] This argument was quickly disposed of by the majority who stated that article 94 is clear as written and the legislature intended for the grounds in article 94 to be exclusive.[68] Applying the statutory interpretation principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the majority determined that the legislature’s decision not to include additional grounds for nullity was intentionally structured to limit the grounds for nullity to the three exclusively listed grounds in article 94.[69] Thus, any further interpretation of article 94 or incorporation of article 7 would be unnecessary and run counter to the principles of statutory interpretation.[70] Justice Crain counters this argument stating that the statutory interpretation principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius “can be helpful when a single law applies to the subject at hand” but “it is not a license to disregard other applicable laws that equally express legislative will.”[71] According to Justice Crain, article 7 “states a fundamental principle of the Civil Code denouncing and invalidating illegal conduct in any act intended to have legal consequences.”[72] In his dissent, Justice Crain maintained that if the legislature intended for the contract of marriage to be the sole exception to the rule articulated in article 7, “a clear statement to that effect is required. Article 94 is not that statement.[73]
Conclusion
In Wederstrandt v. Kol, the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that the general principles of conventional obligations do not apply to the contract of marriage, at least with respect to the sources of absolute nullity.[74] Louisiana Civil Code article 94 lists three sources of absolute nullity for marriages, including only when a marriage is “contracted without a marriage ceremony, by procuration, or in violation of an impediment.”[75] The Louisiana Supreme Court determined that these grounds are exclusive, and the sources of nullity for all other conventional obligations do not apply to the contract of marriage.[76] Particularly, the Court notes that most conventional obligations are absolute nullities when they violate a rule of public order because the object of the contract is illicit or immoral.[77] However, the Court adamantly states that this general principle of conventional obligations does not apply to the contract of marriage.[78] Another potential basis for nullity is found in Louisiana Civil Code article 7 which states that juridical acts cannot be used to “derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the public interest.”[79] However, the majority also determined that marriages cannot be annulled under article 7 because the legislature intended the three grounds for nullity enumerated in article 94 to be exclusive.[80] Based on the facts of Wederstrandt, the majority’s interpretation of article 94 seems to endorse the idea that marriages can in fact be entered into for the illicit and purpose of violating the law.[81]
[1] Wederstrandt v. Kol, 366 So. 3d 47, 49 (La. 2023).
[2] La. Civ. Code art. 2030 (2023).
[3] Wederstrandt, 366 So. 3d at 52.
[4] Id.
[5] See id.
[6] See id. at 56 (Weimer, J., dissenting).
[7] Id. at 49.
[8] Id.
[9]Id. Under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315.1 and 2315.2, the proper parties to sue for survival and wrongful death actions are “[t]he surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either the spouse or the child or children.” La. Civ. Code arts. 2315.1–2315.2 (2023). However, if the decedent leaves no surviving spouse or child, the proper parties to sue for survival and wrongful death actions are “[t]he surviving father and mother of the deceased.” Id. Since Ivie was survived by her husband, Eden, he was the proper party to sue for Ivie’s survival and wrongful death actions. See id. Annulment of Ivie and Eden’s marriage would eliminate Eden’s status as the proper party to sue for Ivie’s survival and wrongful death actions and permit Ivie’s parents to sue instead. See id.
[10] Wederstrandt, 366 So. 3d at 49.
[11] La. Civ. Code art. 2030 (2023).
[12] Wederstrandt, 366 So. 3d at 49.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at 49–50.
[16] Id. at 50.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] Id.
[25] Id. at 51.
[26] Id. Louisiana Civil Code article 9 states: “When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.” La. Civ. Code art. 9 (2023).
[27] Wederstrandt, 366 So. 3d at 51.
[28] Louisiana Civil Code article 87 states: “The requirements for the contract of marriage are: The absence of legal impediment. A marriage ceremony. The free consent of the parties to take each other as husband and wife, expressed at the ceremony.” La. Civ. Code art. 87 (2023).
[29] Wederstrandt, 366 So. 3d at 51. Louisiana Civil Code article 94 states: “A marriage is absolutely null when contracted without a marriage ceremony, by procuration, or in violation of an impediment. A judicial declaration of nullity is not required, but an action to recognize the nullity may be brought by any interested person.” La. Civ. Code art. 94 (2023).
[30] Wederstrandt, 366 So. 3d at 52.
[31] The statutory interpretation doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius means that “when the legislature specifically enumerates a series of things, the legislature’s omission of other items, which could have easily been included in the statute, is deemed intentional.” Id.
[32] Id.
[33] Id.
[34] Id. at 52–53.
[35] Id. at 53.
[36] La. Civ. Code art. 2030 (2023).
[37] Wederstrandt, 366 So. 3d at 53.
[38] Id.
[39] Id.
[40] Id.
[41] Id.
[42] La. Civ. Code art. 1916 (2023).
[43] Id. art. 1914.
[44] Wederstrandt, 366 So. 3d at 53.
[45] Id. at 54 (citing to Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revision of the Law of Marriage: One Baby Step Forward, 48 La. L. Rev. 1131, 1134, n. 20 (1988)).
[46] Id.
[47] Id.
[48] Id.
[49] Id.
[50] Id.
[51] Id. at 54–55.
[52] Id. at 54.
[53] Id.
[54] Id. at 55.
[55] Id.
[56] See id. at 56 (Weimer, J., dissenting).
[57] See id.
[58] Id. at 57 (Crain, J., dissenting).
[59] Id. at 51.
[60] Id. at 52.
[61] Id.
[62] See id. at 56 (Weimer, J., dissenting).
[63] See id. at 56–57.
[64] Id. at 57.
[65] Id.
[66] Id. at 56–59.
[67] La. Civ. Code art. 7 (2023).
[68] Wederstrandt, 366 So. 3d at 53.
[69] Id.
[70] Id.
[71] Id. at 58 (Crain, J., dissenting).
[72] Id. at 59.
[73] Id.
[74] Id. at 52.
[75] La. Civ. Code art. 94 (2023).
[76] Wederstrandt, 366 So. 3d at 52.
[77] Id.
[78] See id.
[79] La. Civ. Code art. 7.
[80] Wederstrandt, 366 So. 3d at 53.
[81] See id. at 56 (Weimer, J., dissenting).